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Abstract 
The neural processes by which we perceive and understand our complex social world are 
currently somewhat of a mystery. This thesis used electroencephalography (EEG) to investigate 
the potential involvement of the mirror neuron system (MNS) and default-mode network 
(DMN) in social cognition. The three experiments contained herein investigated function of 
these networks during a variety of social cognition tasks using two proposed EEG correlates: 
mu suppression for the MNS, and frontal theta suppression for the DMN. The same 20 
participants were tested during all three experiments. For all experiments the general 
hypotheses were that both mu suppression and frontal theta suppression would be detected 
during social cognition. Mu power was assessed as log mean spectral power in the 7.5-12.5Hz 
band at electrodes C3 and C4. Frontal theta suppression was assessed using log mean spectral 
power in the 4-7Hz band at Fz. Additionally, Exact Low Resolution Electromagnetic 
Tomography (eLORETA) was used to more precisely locate the sources of differences in 
spectral power. Experiment 1 compared activity during a social reasoning tasks to activity 
during the solving of physics problems. The hypotheses were partially supported for this 
experiment. Mu suppression was found during social reasoning, even when the task was 
presented as a textual vignette. No support was found for frontal theta suppression as a correlate 
of DMN activity. Experiment 2 investigated activity while participants used a button press to 
identify emotions from facial expressions. The hypotheses were again partially supported. 
Robust mu suppression was associated with facial emotion processing, but no frontal theta 
suppression was detected. Experiment 3 investigated activity during imitation of facial 
expressions. Neither mu suppression nor theta suppression were associated with the facial 
imitation task, failing to support either hypothesis. Taken together, the results of the first two 
experiments offered partial support for the current model of the MNS, and the validity of mu 
suppression as its correlate. However no mu suppression was detected during imitation, often 
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considered a central function of the MNS. This result indicates that the current model of the 
MNS and/or mu suppression may not adequately explain the social cognition process. The 
most likely source of the mu activity in this thesis was found by eLORETA to be the lateral 
postcentral gyri. No frontal theta suppression was detected during social cognition in any of 
the experiments, perhaps indicating that it is not a strong enough correlate to be used in EEG 
studies of the DMN. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
There is perhaps no more routine a psychological process than communication. 
Interpersonal communication is so ordinary that the typical person very rarely appreciates just 
how complex it is. Leaving aside the complexity of production and interpretation of explicit 
communication using language, we also communicate using a tremendous diversity of implicit, 
non-verbal cues. 
Despite the well-practiced ease with which we use language, verbal communication is 
a far more controlled (i.e. conscious, deliberate, attention-demanding) process than non-verbal 
communication. We can choose our words wisely, and ruminate over the meaning of a passage. 
In contrast, communication using non-verbal cues is usually more automatic. We do not intend 
to shift in our chair when nervous, nor do we need to remember to smile upon reuniting with 
an old friend. 
The more primal and reflexive nature of non-verbal communication is further 
evidenced by its development in humans, both on the individual level, and on an evolutionary 
level. Humans learn to use non-verbal communication long before they can competently use 
language. Some evidence suggests that even human neonates can imitate some hand and facial 
movements (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). Furthermore, it is commonly believed that the 
evolutionary predecessors of contemporary humans communicated non-verbally before the 
development of the large modern neo-cortex and associated language abilities (Aiello & 
Dunbar, 1993). However, despite the centrality of communication to the human experience, 
there is little that we know for sure about the neural underpinnings of just how we manage to 
understand each other. 
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Localisation of Function 
Brain functions are often localised to specific areas or networks, and this is especially 
true of the more fundamental and primal processes. For instance, although there is variation 
between individuals in the exact location and size of functional areas, we can be reasonably 
certain that the right field of vision will be neurally linked with the left occipital lobe of the 
brain. 
Less fundamental functions tend to be more difficult to localise. This is in part due to 
the remarkable flexibility of the cerebral cortex.  Many of the functions the brain performs 
today would be beyond the conception of our early ancestors. For instance, the development 
of the human brain occurred under no evolutionary pressure towards playing a violin, but that 
is just one of the panoply of functions it performs today. It therefore stands to reason that a 
substantial proportion of the brain can be co-opted into performing functions for which it was 
not originally designed. With this in mind, caution must be exercised in drawing strong 
conclusions regarding precise localisation of specific functions. 
As an illustration of the problem of localising very particular functions, let us consider 
the fusiform face area (FFA). The FFA is located in the fusiform gyrus, near the temporo-
occipital junction (Brodmann area 37). Using fMRI, Kanwisher, McDermott, and Chun  
(1997) found that this area was significantly more active when participants viewed faces 
compared to when they viewed other objects, such as houses and hands. That study concluded 
that this area was specialised for the processing of faces. Soon after, Gauthier and colleagues 
(1999) investigated one potential confound in the previous study, namely the effect of expertise. 
People encounter a great many faces, and these faces tend to differ in quite subtle ways within 
a given set of constraints. When looking at a face we almost always see two eyes, a mouth, and 
a nose with only slight variation in location and shape. Gauthier and colleagues therefore 
hypothesised that it was a more general expert discrimination task that was activating the FFA 
so strongly. To test this, they created a set of novel objects called ‘greebles’ consisting of a few 
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varying parts in a common configuration, that is to say: similar to faces while not looking at all 
like faces (see Figure 1).  Participants were trained to become experts at distinguishing greebles, 
a process lasting on average 3240 trials. It was found that, after training, the FFA was reliably 
activated in response to the greeble identification task. A subsequent lesion study indicated that 
the greebles were not face-like enough to be processed as a face. Individuals with lesion-
induced facial processing difficulties did not have similar problems learning to identify greebles 
(Gauthier, Behrmann, & Tarr, 2004). The debate about the level of specialisation of the FFA 
continues today (despite its name), and serves as a reminder that there are any number of factors 
that we cannot control for when investigating localisation of function. As such, caution should 
be exercised when localising complex functions. 
 
Figure 1. Four examples of the greebles used by Gauthier and colleagues (1999; examples from Yu, Gauthier, & 
Tarr, 2014). 
Limitations of instruments. 
The limitations of current neuroimaging techniques further confound the task of 
localising brain function. Neuroimaging instruments can be roughly divided into two 
categories on the basis of what correlate of brain activity they record. Electrophysiological 
measurements, such as electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG), 
record the electric or magnetic fields caused by the synchronous firing of groups of neurons. 
The second group of functional neuroimaging techniques, such as functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET), measure blood flow to 
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brain areas under the assumption that a brain region requires (and receives) more blood flow 
when it is more neurally active. 
Brain imaging techniques quantify activity using assumptions based on limited, 
incidental aspects of brain activity. Neither blood flow to a brain area, nor the electric fields at 
the scalp, ‘are’ brain activity. Rather they are silhouettes from which we must, validly or 
invalidly, infer the underlying cause. These inferences are necessarily general, and in the case 
of EEG often refer to wave patterns. EEG wave patterns (or rhythms) reflect the cyclical activity 
of large numbers of spatially aligned cortical neurons, although exactly what this means in terms 
of activity at a neural level is not particularly clear. Likewise the only irrefutable conclusion 
that can be drawn from an increase in the fMRI signal is that the blood in that region has 
become more oxygenated. Such a measurement could be (and most likely is) associated with 
neural activity, but is not a direct measure of neuronal activity.  
Compounding these issues, there are inherent limitations in the spatial and temporal 
resolution of both techniques. EEG records electrical fields using electrodes on the scalp. This 
technique offers excellent temporal resolution (in the order of milliseconds), but poor spatial 
resolution. As the strength of an electric field is proportional to the inverse square of distance 
from its source (Klein & Thorne, 2006), EEG is limited in the depth of activity that can be 
detected. The spatial resolution of EEG is also limited by the arrangement of electrodes, which 
gives only a two dimensional image of activity in the three-dimensional brain. Furthermore, 
electrical activity generated by one area can be conducted through the brain’s ionic medium 
to other locations, a phenomenon called volume conduction, further reducing the ability to 
infer precise sources. It should also be noted that EEG readings generally reflect the 
synchronous activity of large tracts of spatially aligned neurons, which tend to be in the cortex 
(Nunez & Srinivasan, 2005). These properties limit EEG to primarily recording activity in the 
outermost layer of the brain (i.e. the cerebral cortex; Baker, Gabriel, & Lemon, 2003). 
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 fMRI uses a series of MRI scans to capture brain activity. The underlying assumption 
of fMRI is that brain activity is accompanied by an influx of oxygenated blood. Oxygen-
bearing blood (haemoglobin) has different magnetic properties to blood not carrying oxygen 
(deoxyhaemoglobin). With fMRI, brain activity is inferred by comparing the relative levels of 
haemoglobin and deoxyhaemoglobin between experimental and baseline MRI scans (Fiez & 
Petersen, 1998). The temporal resolution of fMRI is in the order of seconds, limited 
biologically by the speed of the haemoglobin influx response. Spatial resolution of fMRI is 
excellent, about 2-3mm regardless of location, but is also biologically limited by how precisely 
oxygenated blood is allocated to active brain areas. 
 The different properties of EEG and fMRI lend them to different applications. EEG is 
useful for investigating rapid, shallow (i.e. cortical) activity, whereas fMRI can be used to assess 
activity deeper in the brain, as long as such activity generates a sufficient haemoglobin response. 
Researchers have overcome the practical difficulties of using the two techniques in conjunction 
relatively recently, and the combination can address the weaknesses of both (Goldman, Stern, 
Engel Jr, & Cohen, 2000). 
Brain Networks 
As the opportunity for new findings of strictly localised functions fades, research is 
increasingly focusing on how parts of the brain interact with one another. Structural data from 
diffusor tensor imaging (DTI) studies have vividly illustrated the density of the connections in 
the human brain. Some of the more complex human behaviours might need to recruit the 
resources of several brain areas. The intricate nature of the interplay between perception and 
information processing that occurs during social cognition almost demands that a network of 
brain areas be required. Some of these networks are the cornerstones of grand theories, two of 
which this thesis will investigate: the mirror neuron system (MNS), and the default-mode 
network (DMN). The MNS has been investigated as a seat of social function since its discovery 
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in the early 1990s. In contrast the DMN has only recently been implicated in social cognition, 
after having been discovered during resting state connectivity analyses in the early 2000s.  
The mirror neuron system. 
The mirror neuron system (MNS) is purported to comprise a network of neurons that 
fire both when one performs an action, and when one witnesses performance of that same 
action (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Almost all direct evidence for mirror neurons stems 
from intracranial recordings of macaques (Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 
1992). Nevertheless, the MNS has been mooted as an important part of the system by which 
humans infer the intentions of others based on their actions (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). In 
macaques, mirror neurons have been observed in premotor areas (F5), the parietal cortex 
(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), and more recently the primary motor cortex (M1) and the 
dorsal premotor cortex (Tkach, Reimer, & Hatsopoulos, 2007).  
It has been suggested that the activation of mirror neurons at premotor sites during 
action observation allows individuals to ‘simulate’ the action in their own mind (Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). Neural networks associated with performing the observed action are 
activated in the observer, including networks associated with the state of mind that would result 
in the performance of that action (Gallese, 2009). By this account, the ability of humans to 
attribute mental states to others (i.e. theory of mind) is inherent, and specialised subconscious 
neural circuits perform the bulk of the work. 
It should be noted that only one study has directly observed mirror neurons in humans. 
Mukamel and colleagues (2010) assessed action-observation congruence in a total of 1177 
individual neurons using intracranial electrodes implanted in the medial frontal and temporal 
cortices of 21 epilepsy patients. Participants either observed an action, were prompted to 
perform that action by a verbal cue, or passively observed the verbal cue as a control. Both 
hand (two different grips) and facial actions (smile, frown) were assessed. It was found that there 
were neurons that fired in response to both action and observation in all assessed areas. There 
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were significant populations of these mirror neurons in the hippocampus, parahippocampal 
gyrus, and supplementary motor area. The dispersed nature of the mirror neurons found by 
Mukamel and colleagues (2010), and the significant mirror neuron activity around the 
hippocampus, is not in strong concordance with the current literature. It may be, however, 
that these areas receive input from the MNS as established by fMRI and EEG. This study was 
necessarily limited by its methodology. Participants were candidates for neurosurgery to 
ameliorate epileptic seizures, raising some doubt as to what inferences can be made about the 
general population. Furthermore, the electrodes were located in order to optimally inform the 
surgeons, not to assess MNS function, hence the lack of assessment of canonical MNS areas. 
Overall this study presents rather weak direct evidence for mirror neurons, and has 
unfortunately not been replicated in the intervening years. As such, nearly all of the evidence 
for a human MNS comes from neuroimaging studies. This evidence should therefore be 
regarded as somewhat preliminary. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging findings. 
 Activity in a human MNS has been inferred from fMRI results. Researchers have 
found action-observation congruent activation in a complex network of areas distributed across 
the brain. This bilateral network includes the posterior part of the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), 
the lateral precentral gyrus (primary motor cortex), and the posterior section of the inferior 
frontal gyrus (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; illustrated in Figure 2).  
Although MNS research originally focused on object-directed hand actions, activation 
of MNS regions has also been observed in response to intransitive actions. Using fMRI, 
Buccino and colleagues (2004) investigated 14 right-handed adults for differences in brain 
activity in response to facial actions performed by either humans, monkeys, or dogs.  It was 
found that during observation of biting, activation was found in the IPL (with two foci, one 
anterior and one posterior), and in the inferior frontal gyrus (with foci in the pars opercularis 
and adjacent lateral premotor areas), regardless of the species being observed. Activation of areas  
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Figure 2. Regions implicated in the human MNS (adapted from Gray & Lewis, 1918, p. 728; Hamilton, Brindley, 
& Frith, 2007). 
located in the left hemisphere in response to biting was similar across species. Activation in the 
right hemisphere foci were greatest when observing a human biting and weakest when 
observing a dog biting, with the biting monkey inducing an intermediate level of activity. This 
could indicate a degree of species specificity in MNS function, consistent with the idea that the 
main function of the MNS is to judge the intentions of conspecifics. Some elements of the 
human MNS could perhaps process some of the actions of a monkey (and even a dog, to a 
lesser extent), as some traits are similar between species. Macaques have been found to exhibit 
mirror neuron activity in response to human actions after all (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & 
Fogassi, 1996). Buccino and colleagues (2004) authors also assessed response to communicative 
actions: speaking for the human, lip-smacking for the monkey, and barking for the dog. Frontal 
lobe response was found to decrease with species similarity, a pattern that paralleled the biting 
results. Activation in occipital areas was found independent of the species being viewed.  
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Electroencephalography findings. 
The human MNS has also been studied using EEG. The vastly superior temporal 
resolution of EEG over fMRI is particularly useful when studying action-understanding. From 
common experience, it is clear that a process like facial expression understanding occurs far 
more rapidly than the second-scale temporal resolution of fMRI can fully capture. For instance, 
it is not often that it takes us more than a second to infer that someone is happy from their 
smile. As such, fMRI data can only go so far to elucidate the finer temporal order of brain 
activity. The current standard method of detecting MNS activity using EEG is to investigate 
mu wave activity at central electrodes. Mu is a subcategory of the alpha frequency band, and is 
present during the absence of movement or somatosensory input (Kuhlman, 1978). Mu is 
recorded from the sensorimotor cortex and encompasses the frequency range of approximately 
7.5-11.5Hz, although this range is not particularly consistent across studies, with varying cut-
offs (e.g. Arroyo et al., 1993; Oberman, Ramachandran, & Pineda, 2008; Salenius, Schnitzler, 
Salmelin, Jousmäki, & Hari, 1997). The mu rhythm has been characterised as an ‘idle’ state, 
interrupted when motor processing occurs. The exact nature of the link between the MNS 
and mu suppression is not well-known, however it has been hypothesised that motor area 
activity may be modulated upstream by activity in premotor areas, including regions of the 
MNS (Pineda, 2005). 
One particular property of mu activity has strongly implicated its involvement in a 
human MNS: it is also attenuated during action observation (Cochin, Barthelemy, Lejeune, 
Roux, & Martineau, 1998). This association has led to mu wave activity being used as a proxy 
measurement for MNS function (Fu & Franz, 2014; Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson, 2004; 
Oberman et al., 2005). The prototypical pattern of results was garnered by Cochin, Barthelemy, 
Roux, and Martineau  (1999), who used EEG to investigate brain wave activity from 20 right-
handed participants in response to execution versus observation of bilateral finger movements. 
They found a general decrease in spectral power in response to both action and observation 
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compared to rest across all frequency bands assessed (seven bands assessed between 3 and 35Hz), 
but this difference was only significant in a single band from 7-10.5Hz (i.e. mu activity). 
Exploratory analyses indicated that the difference was significant at nine electrodes: F7, F8, F4, 
T6, T5, C3, C4, P3, and P4 (see Figure 4 on page 26  for a diagram of electrode locations). 
These electrode sites are roughly in line with the regions implicated by fMRI. F7 and F8 are 
located around the pars opercularis and inferior frontal gyri, T5 and T6 at the temporo-occipital 
junctions, C3 and C4 over the sensorimotor areas, and perhaps the supplementary motor area 
(although that lies deeper in the central fissure and is therefore more difficult to assess using 
EEG). P3 and P4 may have been capturing activity from the inferior parietal lobule. F4 is 
located around the right hemisphere homolog of Broca’s area, perhaps reflecting premotor 
activity. Alpha activity in this frequency band is generally considered mu only if it is localised 
around the sensorimotor areas, even so, the concordance is noteworthy. There is, however, a 
good chance that mu activity from the sensorimotor areas could have been conducted to these 
other regions. Nevertheless, these results provide evidence for a human MNS, convergent with 
the fMRI literature. 
Findings from simultaneous recordings. 
In addition to the concordant activity profiles of mu suppression and the MNS as 
observed using fMRI, simultaneous EEG-fMRI recording has provided support for the 
proposition that mu suppression is a signature of MNS activity. Arnstein, Cui, Keysers, Maurits, 
and Gazzola (2011) studied the correlation between the blood oxygenation in putative MNS 
areas and mu suppression. While fMRI and EEG were recorded, participants either watched a 
video of a hand and an object with three degrees of interaction (manipulation of the object, 
movement without manipulation, and a static hand), or performed a movement with their eyes 
or hands. The hand movement was an object-directed action: moving an object on a small 
table in the scanner. Mu suppression at C3 (the hemisphere contralateral to the hand used) was 
correlated with action-observation congruent activity in the postcentral gyrus (BA1, primary 
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somatosensory cortex), the inferior parietal lobule, and dorsal premotor areas. The authors 
noted that this does not mean that all of those areas generate mu. These results also cannot rule 
out additional functions from suppressing mu, besides purported MNS activating tasks. Indeed, 
areas of blood oxygenation that were not concordant across observation and execution were 
also correlated with mu suppression. Nevertheless, Arnstein and colleagues (2011) results 
suggest two things, namely: that mu originates from at least one of these MNS areas, and that 
mu suppression is correlated with MNS activity as defined by fMRI. 
Braadbaart, Williams, and Waiter (2013) used an fMRI-EEG paradigm in which the 
two recordings were not made simultaneously, but sequentially on the same participants. They 
aimed to further investigate the relationship between blood oxygenation in MNS areas and mu 
suppression. There were three conditions, in two of these conditions the participants were 
shown video of a handle being moved either by a hand, or by a circle. In the third condition 
participants used a handle of their own to imitate the video of the handle being moved by a 
hand. Mu suppression was found to be correlated with blood oxygenation in some MNS areas, 
namely the right inferior parietal lobe, premotor cortex and inferior frontal gyrus. There were, 
however, a number of regions outside the putative MNS that showed correlations with mu 
suppression. Despite the limitations of the sequential recording methodology compared to 
simultaneous recording, the results of Braadbart and colleagues (2013) have raised some doubts 
about the specificity of the association between mu and the MNS as found by fMRI. 
The default-mode network. 
With the recent focus on networks of brain activity, some research has started to 
investigate how the brain is connected at rest. There are a number of resting-state networks 
(Damoiseaux et al., 2006), with the most studied being the default-mode network (DMN; 
Raichle et al., 2001). The DMN (illustrated in Figure 3) as found using fMRI is a network of 
brain structures including the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), lateral anterior cingulate cortex 
(vACC), precuneus, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and the medial, lateral, and inferior 
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parietal cortices (Broyd et al., 2009; Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, & Menon, 2003; Hafkemeijer, 
van der Grond, & Rombouts, 2012). 
This network is known to show synchronised activity when the brain is not engaged 
in any task i.e. it reflects the brain’s ‘default’ activity (Raichle et al., 2001). Activity in the 
DMN is suppressed when the individual becomes engaged in a task. DMN activity is not 
completely extinguished during task-related activity, but appears to be suppressed to a degree 
reflecting the required cognitive load of the task (Fransson, 2006; Singh & Fawcett, 2008). One 
notable exception to this diffuse pattern of deactivation occurs during tasks requiring self-
referential thought where the mPFC is not deactivated, but exhibits an increase in activity, 
perhaps indicating a role in introspection. DMN activity has also been observed during the 
early stages of sleep (Horovitz et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 3. Labelled fMRI image of the default-mode network (adapted from Hafkemeijer et al., 2012). 
In addition to the DMN, a network of areas has been identified that activates when 
attention is externally directed (Fox et al., 2005). This network, including the intraparietal 
INVESTIGATING SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND REASONING 13 
sulcus, frontal eye field, and precentral sulcus, has been called the task-positive network (TPN). 
Activity in the TPN is anti-correlated with activity in the DMN: when the DMN is deactivated 
the TPN tends to be activated and vice-versa. Fox and colleagues (2005) suggested that the 
DMN and TPN may represent a single underlying construct, and that the most elucidating 
factor may not be the networks’ individual activity per se, but rather the mechanism of 
switching between the two. This may reflect an individual switching from an internal to an 
external focus. Together these networks are sometimes called the low frequency resting-state 
networks. In addition to the two networks previously mentioned, there appear to be a number 
of other networks active in the idle brain, however those are beyond the scope of this paper 
(see Mantini, Perrucci, Del Gratta, Romani, & Corbetta, 2007 for a review). 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging findings. 
Researchers usually investigate DMN function using fMRI. When using fMRI, 
resting-state connectivity is generally quantified by measuring the tendency over time of two 
areas to exhibit concurrent blood oxygenation. In terms of the DMN, fMRI research has 
focused on very-low frequency blood oxygen fluctuations. Although fMRI is not well suited 
to studying oscillations in activity due to its low temporal resolution (Rippon, Brock, Brown, 
& Boucher, 2007), the activity associated with the resting-state cycles at around the 0.012-
0.1Hz range (Fransson, 2005). This long period of oscillation renders the activity detectable by 
fMRI. Nevertheless, measuring such slow cycles (longer than one cycle every ten seconds) 
presents some pragmatic difficulties, with one cycle potentially taking longer than a minute to 
complete. Ideally as many oscillations as possible should be captured to increase the statistical 
power of the study. With such slow cycles the participant must remain in the scanner for some 
time, being careful to remain stationary so as not to introduce movement artefacts. Brain 
regions are inferred to be connected to the degree that they exhibit correlated low-frequency 
cycles of blood oxygenation. 
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Recent literature has also implicated the DMN in social cognition. Jack and colleagues 
(2013) have suggested that the DMN and TPN reflect different cognitive processing contexts. 
Under this model the DMN is active when the individual is performing social reasoning, and 
the TPN is active during mechanistic reasoning. The two networks retain the relationship that 
they have under other models, with only one network able to be active at a time. Jack and 
colleagues (2013) suggested that differences in resting-state network activation between tasks 
found in previous studies may have been primarily due to variations in the required reasoning 
domain. To test their ideas, the researchers gathered fMRI data from 45 university students. 
The participants were given reasoning tasks that were either mechanical (relating to physics), 
or social (making mental inferences of belief). Tasks also varied on the basis of perceptual 
modality, being either a textual vignette or short video clip. The DMN and TPN were defined 
using resting-state data from a public database. It was found that regions of the two networks 
were reciprocally activated across the two types of reasoning task; the DMN was activated 
during social tasks, and the TPN during mechanistic tasks. Jack and colleagues (2013) 
concluded that this shows that the switch between the DMN and TPN does not reflect internal 
versus external attention, but social versus mechanistic reasoning. These results imply that only 
one reasoning system can be active at a time, an idea that was later extended to link 
dehumanisation to increased TPN engagement (Jack, Dawson, & Norr, 2013). It was also 
concluded that DMN-TPN switching did not reflect task engagement, as there was no effect 
of the modality of the stimulus (text versus video) on which network was engaged. 
Electroencephalography findings. 
A number of studies have investigated the electrophysiological correlates of the DMN, 
but a consensus has not yet been reached on how DMN activity is reflected in EEG. No 
signature as simple as mu for the MNS has yet been identified, although there are some 
candidates. 
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Chen, Feng, Zhao, Yin, and Wang (2008) investigated DMN function using 
conventional bands of EEG frequencies. High-density 128-channel EEG was recorded from 
15 right-handed adult females during eyes-closed and eyes-open resting states. A range of 
oscillations were found in a variety of brain areas. Prefrontal delta activity (0.5-3.5Hz) was 
observed, with higher power in the eyes-open condition. Frontocentral theta (4-7Hz) was also 
observed, with reduced power in the eyes-open condition. Alpha-1 (7.5-9.5Hz), alpha-2 (10-
12Hz), and beta-1 (13-23Hz) were all recorded bilaterally from posterior regions, with alpha-
1 also occurring in anterior regions. These frequencies were attenuated during the eyes-open 
condition. Beta-2 (24-34Hz) and gamma (34-45Hz) oscillations were recorded prefrontally, 
with no significant power change across conditions. Chen and colleagues’ (2008) observations 
serve as a useful illustration of the EEG that can be expected when recording from the resting 
brain, although their claims that the findings reflect DMN activity specifically may be a bit 
strong given that several other resting-state networks have been described (Greicius, 2008). 
Knyazev and colleagues (2011) used EEG to investigate the DMN in 48 neurotypical 
adults. To examine the purported self-referential and social aspects of the DMN, activity was 
recorded during social tasks, in addition to a resting state. Participants performed two tasks that 
were designed to vary in the amount of self-referential thought they would elicit. In both tasks 
participants viewed facial expressions on a computer monitor. In the high self-reference 
condition participants were asked how they would react in an encounter with the presented 
person. In the low self-reference condition the participant was asked to judge what emotion 
was most likely to cause the facial expression. Standard Low Resolution Electromagnetic 
Tomography (sLORETA) was used to generate a 3D representation of the sources of the 
various EEG bands. These images were transferred to an fMRI analysis package (GIFT), where 
spatial independent components analysis (ICA) was utilised to find maximally spatially 
independent brain networks. The network most spatially similar to the fMRI DMN was 
selected to represent the DMN, although only the posterior hub (precuneus and posterior 
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cingulate) could be matched. During the resting-state recordings, a self-report instrument was 
employed to measure the participant’s levels of self-referential thought. Scores on this measure 
were significantly correlated with alpha activity in the identified DMN network. During the 
social judgment task a similar pattern of posterior alpha activity to the resting-state was 
observed. Posterior alpha was not present during the emotion judgment control task. This study 
is interesting for several reasons. Chiefly, the application of 3D reconstruction and spatial 
independent components analysis to EEG data is highly novel. This new technique does, 
however, produce results that are difficult to interpret in relation to previous studies. That the 
results were broadly in keeping with those of fMRI studies is encouraging, although the authors 
concede that higher frequency oscillations may have been expected, as they have been found 
to be more associated with the fMRI BOLD signal (Scheeringa et al., 2008). Their results also 
seem to fit somewhat with Jack and colleagues’ (Jack, Dawson, Begany, et al., 2013) 
social/mechanistic model of the DMN; the explicit emotion judgment task required less social 
reasoning and generated commensurately less DMN activity. However, this pattern of results 
could equally be associated with the external versus internal attention differences between the 
tasks, a factor that has been found to affect posterior alpha (Cooper, Croft, Dominey, Burgess, 
& Gruzelier, 2003), and is posited to affect DMN activity itself (Fox et al., 2005). 
Simultaneous recordings. 
A simultaneous EEG-fMRI paradigm has also been used to more accurately investigate 
the EEG correlates of the DMN found in fMRI studies. Mantini and colleagues (2007) applied 
exploratory analysis of fMRI data to identify six distinct resting-state networks, including the 
DMN, and then used simultaneous EEG-fMRI to identify the electrophysiological correlates. 
They found alpha (8-13Hz), and beta (13-30Hz) activity were weakly but significantly 
associated with DMN activity. No source analyses were performed on the EEG data, beyond 
inferences from the concurrent fMRI data that the rhythms originated in the DMN.  
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Scheeringa and colleagues (2008) also used simultaneous EEG-fMRI to investigate 
correlations between the two instruments during a resting state. In particular, they investigated 
the frontal theta rhythm, which has been consistently associated with attention-demanding 
tasks (Ray & Cole, 1985). Source analysis has indicated that frontal theta originates from an 
area overlapping the frontal hub of the DMN, around the anterior cingulate or medial frontal 
cortices (Scheeringa et al., 2008). Scheeringa and colleagues (2008) found that frontal theta was 
significantly negatively correlated with DMN activity. It was concluded that frontal theta 
desynchronisation is a reflection of DMN activity. The authors proposed that the suppression 
of theta was not recorded at other known DMN regions either because it is only generated in 
the anterior hub of the DMN, or simply because activity from other DMN areas is not 
detectable at the scalp. 
The results from EEG investigations of the DMN are not entirely consistent, but do 
seem to indicate that DMN activity (as observed by fMRI) is positively associated with alpha 
activity, and negatively associated with theta. Slow oscillations such as theta and alpha have 
long been thought to be a measure of brain idling (Adrian & Matthews, 1934), processing of 
internal mental context, and long-range synchronization (von Stein & Sarnthein, 2000). These 
functions certainly seem consistent with those of the proposed of the DMN. Given the theta 
recordings of Scheeringa and colleagues (2008), a switch between alpha and theta generation 
could indicate a switch between DMN and TPN activation. Frontal theta has been found to 
originate in the medial prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (Ishii et al., 1999), the 
front hub of the DMN. It is therefore plausible that the frontal theta rhythm could reflect idling 
of the DMN during directed attention. The notion that theta desynchronisation reflects DMN 
activity is not, however, supported by the findings of Chen and colleagues (2008) who found 
significant frontal theta activity during rest.  
The idea of posterior alpha as reflecting DMN activity is plausible. The posterior alpha 
rhythm during rest was one of the first studied EEG patterns (Goldman et al., 2000), and was 
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the earliest definitive evidence that the brain is never truly inactive. Posterior alpha is suppressed 
by attention (Sauseng et al., 2005), and has been found to be present during periods of 
internally-directed attention, and suppressed during periods of externally directed attention 
(Cooper et al., 2003). Furthermore, alpha activity has been found to be negatively correlated 
with theta activity (Klimesch, 1999). The similarities to the purported functions of the DMN, 
in addition to the results of Knyazev and colleagues (2011) point to posterior alpha as a potential 
signature of the DMN. 
The Present Study 
The broad aims of the present thesis were to use electroencephalography (EEG) to 
investigate activity of the mirror-neuron system (MNS) and default-mode network (DMN) 
during a variety of simulated social reasoning tasks. The utility of proposed EEG correlates for 
the networks were assessed: central mu for the MNS, and frontal theta for the DMN. In 
addition to standard comparisons at electrode sites, the sources of the EEG signatures were 
investigated using Exact Low Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography (eLORETA). It was 
hypothesised that mu suppression and frontal theta suppression would be associated with social 
reasoning. When interpreting the eLORETA figures in the present thesis, it may be useful to 
note that all contrasts have been arranged such that mu suppression in the hypothesised 
direction would be displayed as positive differences (red-yellow) in central lateral areas. 
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Chapter 2: Deliberative Social Reasoning 
Despite the proposal that the mirror neuron system (MNS) is the seat of social cognition 
(Oberman, Pineda, & Ramachandran, 2007), there has been little research investigating mu 
during general social cognition tasks. Most past research has focused on small components of 
social cognition, such as emotion observation (e.g. Moore, Gorodnitsky, & Pineda, 2012), or 
the processing of simple action intentions (e.g. Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson, & McNair, 
2004). This experiment will focus on activity during general, intransitive social reasoning. 
A key study motivating Experiment 1 of the present thesis is that of Oberman, Pineda, 
and Ramachandran (2007) which used electroencephalography (EEG) to investigate how MNS 
activation varies in participants according to degree of social involvement in a video. Social 
involvement varied over four levels with increasing degrees of social involvement: (1) visual 
white noise; (2) three non-interacting actors throwing a ball up and down to themselves; (3) 
three actors throwing a ball between themselves; or (4) three actors throwing the ball between 
themselves and also to the camera. MNS activation was operationalised as the degree to which 
the social conditions (i.e. 2, 3, and 4) showed mu suppression at C3, C4, and Cz compared to 
visual noise. It was found that mu suppression was associated with the degree of social 
interaction in the video. The video with the actors throwing the ball to the camera resulted in 
the most mu suppression, and the video with the actors throwing the ball to themselves elicited 
the least. The authors concluded that MNS activity is modulated by degree of social interaction, 
although a replication by Horan and colleagues (2014) did not find a difference in mu 
suppression between conditions 2 and 3. Nevertheless, both studies demonstrated mu 
suppression in response to a relatively natural social situation, with no particular object-directed 
component.  
The present experiment was an EEG replication of the Jack and colleagues’ (2013) study 
investigating DMN function during social reasoning tasks (outlined in Chapter 1, see page 14). 
The aim of the experiment was to use EEG to investigate the role of the MNS and DMN in 
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social cognition. Participants were presented with a short video or text vignette and a yes/no 
question. Each trial was intended to evoke processing in either the social domain, or the 
physical domain. No stimulus had a specific object-directed component; the social-video 
stimuli were interactions between actors, and the physics-video stimuli sometimes contained 
people demonstrating physical principles. The textual stimuli contained no movement, nor any 
visual action representation. Although action-processing might have occurred in response to 
action words in the textual stimuli, such words occurred in both the physics and social texts. 
Although the MNS has been proposed to be crucial to our social understanding 
(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), we might not necessarily expect to observe MNS activity 
during complex social cognition. A componential model of social cognition has been proposed 
that divides social processing into two domains (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). The 
underlying theory is that there exist two subdomains of social cognition. The first type is 
executed rapidly and automatically, whereas the other is characterised by more complex and 
considered inferences. Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) refer to these as perceptual and 
cognitive inference processes respectively.  
Pineda and Hecht (2009) sought to link the componential model with MNS theory 
using EEG in 23 neurotypical, right-handed adults. Mu suppression was measured during tasks 
designed to test either the social-perceptual or social-cognitive systems. To engage the social-
perceptual system, participants were asked to identify the emotion depicted in a face, cropped 
to show just the eyes, with gender and race identification as control tasks. The social-cognitive 
system was tested using a task where participants were asked to pick the last frame of a comic 
strip on the basis of mental attribution to the characters it contained. Controls for the comic 
task were a comic absent of characters (i.e. with only physical objects), or depicting a character 
simply interacting with an object. It was found that degree of mu suppression was correlated 
with accuracy in the emotion judging task, evidence that greater MNS activity is associated 
with better emotion judgment. No such pattern was found for gender identification, and the 
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reverse pattern was observed for race identification. With respect to the social-cognitive tasks, 
degree of mu suppression was not significantly correlated with accuracy when completing the 
mental attribution comic strips, or the physical object strips. There was a correlation between 
degree of mu suppression and accuracy in the comic strips containing only a character and a 
physical object, perhaps reflecting enhanced MNS activation in response to object directed 
action. Pineda and Hecht (2009) concluded that the MNS is the basis for the social perceptual 
component of social reasoning, as mu suppression was only correlated with accuracy during 
the perceptual tasks. 
Under the MNS account of the componential model of social cognition immediate 
theory of mind judgments are executed by the MNS-based social-perceptual subsystem. In 
contrast, complementary social-cognitive processes may be used for more complex judgments, 
operating more slowly and being more associated more with general cognitive abilities. 
Although Pineda and Hecht (2009) did not propose a basis for social-cognitive processes, the 
DMN seems plausible given subsequent research indicating that it is active during complex 
social cognition (Jack, Dawson, Begany, et al., 2013; Mars et al., 2012), but not during more 
perceptual tasks like emotion recognition (Knyazev et al., 2011).  
If the componential model of social cognition is accurate, it is unlikely that MNS 
activity would be detected during the social processing involved in the present experiment. 
However, it seems improbable that a categorical delineation exists between situations that 
require the utilisation of either system, some (perhaps most) tasks will likely require a 
combination of the two. When viewing video of a social interaction, for instance, it is likely 
that the MNS would be utilised to perceive the state of mind of the actors before inferences 
are made using the social-cognitive processes. 
Several studies have raised the problem of classifying mu, given the poor spatial 
resolution and volume conduction of the EEG signal (e.g. Bernier, Dawson, Webb, & Murias, 
2007; Oberman et al., 2007; Raymaekers, Wiersema, & Roeyers, 2009). This is of particular 
22                             INVESTIGATING SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND REASONING 
concern if the DMN is active during social cognition, as proposed by Jack and colleagues 
(2013), and is reflected in posterior alpha, as proposed by Knyazev and colleagues (2011). The 
posterior alpha pattern is powerful, and could well be propagated to central electrodes via 
volume conduction. To further confound matters, the posterior alpha rhythm may be 
modulated simply by visual attention (Sauseng et al., 2005). Matching stimuli, especially video, 
with different content according to their visual attention demands presents possibly 
insurmountable difficulties. 
In the original study by Jack and colleagues (Jack, Dawson, Begany, et al., 2013) it was 
found that social reasoning elicited DMN activity. In keeping with the results of Scheeringa 
and colleagues (2008), it was therefore hypothesised that less theta activity would be recorded 
at Fz during social reasoning trials compared to during physics trials. It was also hypothesised 
that mu suppression would be recorded from participants during the social reasoning trials 
compared to the physics trials, reflecting activity of the MNS. 
Labelling activity as ‘mu’ implies both a frequency range (7.5-12.5Hz) and a 
somatosensory source; activity in this range was referred to as central alpha until its source had 
been investigated. In addition to comparing central alpha activity at C3 and C4, and theta (4-
7Hz) activity at Fz, the present study used Exact Low Resolution Electromagnetic 
Tomography (eLORETA) to generate a 3D voxel-based map of spectral activity. This allowed 
for the differentiation of mu generators and posterior alpha generators, a currently novel 
approach, though not without precedent (Bowers, Saltuklaroglu, Harkrider, & Cuellar, 2013; 
Hoekstra, Bartels, Verweij, & Boomsma, 2007). 
Method 
Participants. 
Twenty volunteers (13 female, 7 male) participated in the experiment. Twelve were 
recruited from the University of Otago Psychology Research Participation website 
INVESTIGATING SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND REASONING 23 
(web.psy.otago.ac.nz/prp) and were reimbursed for their travel expenses with a NZ$20 grocery 
voucher. Another eight participants were psychology undergraduates recruited from the 
University of Otago Department of Psychology experimental participation programme, and 
were given course credit after completing a short worksheet outlining the experiment. There 
were 19 right-handed participants, and 1 left-handed. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 25 
years (m=21.25) and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing. 
Materials. 
Experiments were undertaken in the Psychology Department EEG facility at the 
University of Otago. A demographic questionnaire was administered which included date of 
birth, and level of education. The participants were also asked if they, or a first-degree relative, 
had ever been diagnosed with a mental health disorder (see Appendix A for the demographic 
form). Three instruments were administered to evaluate participant variables, outlined in the 
following section. 
Instruments. 
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was used to 
assess participants’ verbal and perceptual reasoning. The WASI is an approximately 30-minute 
long experimenter-administered test used to estimate IQ on the basis of four subscales: block 
design, vocabulary, similarities, and matrix reasoning. 
The Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAPQ; Hurley, Losh, Parlier, Reznick, 
& Piven, 2007) was used to measure subclinical autistic traits. The BAPQ is a self-administered 
36-item instrument. Participants are asked to indicate on a scale of 1-6 how often short 
statements apply to them (e.g. “People have to talk me into trying something new”). The 
BAPQ was presented using a web browser. Question order was randomised for each 
participant. Items from the cognitive-perceptual scale of the Schizotypal Personality 
Questionnaire – Brief (SPQ-B; Raine & Benishay, 1995) were randomly intermingled amongst 
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the BAPQ items to improve the discriminant validity of the BAPQ (see Appendix C, Appendix 
D, and Appendix E for questionnaire items). 
The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory – Short Form (EHI-SF; Veale, 2014) was used 
to evaluate handedness. The EHI-SF is a version of the original EHI (Oldfield, 1971) with 
some of the less relevant items removed. It is a self-report instrument in which the participant 
indicates which hand they generally use to perform four tasks on a five-point scale (left to right; 
see Appendix A). 
Stimuli.  
Stimuli were provided by Dr Anthony Jack, and were the same as used in the study  
that provided the basis for the present experiment (Jack, Dawson, Begany, et al., 2013). There 
was a total of 20 stimuli of each type (physics-video, physics-text, social-video, social-text), 
and corresponding yes/no questions to be presented afterwards (see Appendix F for examples 
of the stimuli.) 
 Stimuli from the social-text condition were originally adapted from Saxe and Powell 
(2006). The short vignettes detailed a social situation in which one or more actors held a false 
belief, and the participant was asked about the attitudes or beliefs of one of the actors. Social-
video stimuli were recorded at the Case Western University Department of Psychological 
Sciences by Angela Ciccia, using student actors (Jack, Dawson, Begany, et al., 2013). The video 
showed two actors interacting, and the corresponding question concerned the attitudes or 
beliefs of one of the actors. 
Stimuli from the physics-text condition were adapted from public domain physics 
problems, and participants were asked about what would happen following the situation 
described in the vignette. Physics-video stimuli were provided by the Video Encyclopaedia of 
Physics (Jack, Dawson, Begany, et al., 2013), and demonstrated a mechanical principle (also 
described in a voice over). The questions tested understanding of the illustrated principle. 
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Text stimuli had similar average lengths between conditions, and similar Flesch Reading 
Ease scores. Some vignettes were superficially modified to localise them for New Zealand 
participants (e.g. changing units to metric, changing city names). Both types of video stimuli 
were converted to h.264 format with MP3 audio. The physics video stimuli were higher 
resolution than the social video stimuli (720×480 vs. 352×288), as such the social videos were 
upscaled to 720×480. 
Hardware. 
Neuropsychological tests were administered using two Windows XP computers (links 
to specifications in Appendix B). One computer presented the stimuli and recorded responses 
(the stimulus computer), and another recorded the participant’s electroencephalogram (the 
EEG computer). Participants were comfortably seated on a computer chair approximately 
60cm from the stimulus computer monitor. EEG tests were administered in a safety-tested 
body-protected electrical area (BPEA) by a first-aid trained experimenter. 
Images from the stimulus computer were presented to the participant using an Asus 
VG248QE 24" (61cm) 144Hz WLED/TN monitor. This was a high-end consumer-grade 
monitor with a 144Hz refresh rate and advertised 1ms grey-to-grey response time (ASUSTeK 
Computer Inc., 2014).  
Where reaction time was an important variable, responses were recorded using a 
custom-made input device (the response box). The response box was used to obtain precise 
reaction times. It consisted of two identical ambidextrous computer mouses, each with their 
left and right microswitches connected directly to an Arduino Uno microcontroller. The 
microcontroller was flashed to use the standard HID-keyboard interface. The buttons were 
polled every 10ms, resulting in a randomly distributed, sub-10ms error at the hardware level. 
When there were two options, the participant responded with the index fingers of either hand. 
When the experiment presented four options, the participant responded with the middle and 
index fingers of both hands. 
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Triggers were sent from the stimulus computer to the EEG computer via a parallel port 
connection. EEG was recorded using a 32-channel Ag/AgCl sintered Advanced Neuro 
Technology (ANT) WaveGuard cap connected to an ANT Refa8 32-channel amplifier. 
Electrode locations are illustrated in Figure 4 below. A linked mastoid reference was used, and 
the ground electrode was located halfway between Fpz and Fz. EEG data were continuously 
recorded at 1024Hz using ANT Advanced Source Analysis (ASA) software version 4.7.3.1. 
 
Figure 4. Locations of the 32 electrodes of an ANT WaveGuard cap. The electrodes of interest for MNS mu 
activity (C3, C4) are highlighted in orange, and the electrode interest for DMN theta activity (Fz) is highlighted 
in blue. 
Facial response was measured using electromyography (EMG) recorded from Ambu 
Blue Sensor NF electrodes attached to the right zygomatic major (cheek) and left corrugator 
supercilii (brow). EMG was amplified using auxiliary channels of the EEG amplifier. 
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Software. 
The experiment was presented using a program written in Matlab using Psychtoolbox 
(version 3.0.10; see Kleiner et al., 2007). This toolbox provides an interface between Matlab 
and low-level graphics procedures, facilitating the high-precision presentation of visual stimuli. 
The experimenter monitored the participant in the EEG room using a live video feed and 
secondary monitors in a conjoining room. 
Procedure. 
After giving informed consent the participant completed the demographic information 
form and the EHI-SF. The participant was then taken to a quiet room where the WASI was 
administered by a trained experimenter. 
On completion of the WASI, the participant was led to the EEG room, where they 
completed the BAPQ/SPQ-B in a web browser. When this was finished the electrode cap was 
fitted and facial EMG electrodes were applied while the task was explained. Once all electrodes 
were attached, the experimenter administered a short tutorial outlining what data was being 
collected, and how best to minimise artefacts. The participant was then seated in front of the 
stimulus PC, the lights were lowered, and the experiment began. Eight minutes of resting-state 
activity was first recorded for posterity, and to familiarise the participants with the procedure. 
All participants contributed data to all experiments in one 2-hour session. The 
experimenter returned to the EEG room between each experiment and checked if the 
participant was comfortable to proceed with the next experiment. 
The present experiment was an exact EEG replication of Jack et al’s (2013) fMRI study. 
Participants were presented with social and mechanistic reasoning tasks. Figure 5 illustrates the 
experimental procedure.  
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A 2x2 design was used. The two manipulations were named reasoning domain, and 
stimulus medium. Both manipulations had two levels, trials consisted of either a social or a 
physics problem (reasoning domain: social, physics), and the stimulus was presented either as a 
video, or a passage of text (stimulus medium: video, text). There were therefore four 
combinations of the two manipulations: social-video, social-text, physics-video, and physics-
text. During each trial a 20-second stimulus was presented (the stimulus presentation period). 
This stimulus was either a video, or a short text vignette. After presentation of the stimulus a 
short yes/no textual question was presented for 7 seconds (the question period). Participants 
responded to the question using the response box. The participant’s response was highlighted 
red, and was unable to be changed. 
Trials were presented in random order in four four-trial blocks, with a 27-second 
fixation period between each block. Between each trial a fixation period of random duration 
was presented (1, 3, or 5 seconds). Four practice trials (one of each type) were presented with 
instructions before the experimental trials. 
Analysis. 
EEG data pre-processing. 
All EEG data were downsampled to 512Hz for analysis. The continuous data were low-
pass filtered at 40Hz, and high-pass filtered at 0.01Hz. All spectral power analyses were 
normalised using a log transform (10 × ln p). Within-subject comparisons of spectral power at 
electrodes between conditions (electrode-wise comparisons) were conducted using paired t-
tests. 
The electrode-wise spectral power was compared directly between conditions, which 
is a departure from previous studies where mu suppression relative to the participant’s baseline 
is compared between conditions. This departure was rationalised in several ways. Firstly the 
within-subjects comparisons are mathematically equivalent, regardless of the values being 
30                             INVESTIGATING SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND REASONING 
subtracted from a constant for each participant. Secondly, mu suppression is always going to be 
defined relative to a control condition, and it does not seem inherently more valid that the 
control task is fixation than, for instance, watching another video, especially given how much 
activity we know occurs during ‘rest’. Furthermore, having the actual values for mu power 
allows us to more readily compare suppression between experiments in studies where the same 
participants were used, such as the ones presented in this thesis. 
Continuous data were epoched, and then an independent components analysis (ICA) 
was performed (using the ‘extended’ option in EEGLAB). Epochs were then rejected on the 
basis of the ICA data. Trials with clear paroxysmal artefacts were rejected, as were trials with 
noise that was highly correlated across independent components (ICs; indicating a poor 
decomposition). ICA was then performed again in order to obtain a cleaner decomposition, 
and ICs were subtracted from the EEG data with the help of the ADJUST plugin for EEGLAB 
(Mognon, Jovicich, Bruzzone, & Buiatti, 2011). Eliminated ICs were reflective of eye 
movements, blinks, neck and jaw muscle activity, and general noise. 
Matlab timestamps indicated that there was some unreliability in how quickly a trigger 
was sent from the stimulus computer to the recording computer when requested. This delay 
was typically around 15ms, but sometimes up to 30ms. Furthermore, there was generally a 
small difference (around ±8ms, up to ±35ms) between when the stimulus was scheduled to 
appear and when it was actually displayed (as reported by Psychtoolbox). With this in mind, 
the trigger file recorded by the recording PC was processed to enhance its accuracy. These two 
delays were summed, and subtracted from the corresponding times in the trigger file. An 
example of the effect of this technique on unreliability of trigger times is illustrated in Figure 
6. 
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Figure 6. The latency between when triggers were sent by the stimulus PC and when they were received by the 
recording PC as a function of experiment time. The blue line indicates the original latencies, and the red line 
indicates the latencies after correction. 
 
Although some variability remains, it is clear that the reliability of the trigger times has 
been enhanced. The large spikes in Figure 6 are generally block markers; other more time 
sensitive operations took priority over these events in the experiment’s programming. 
Additional variability could be from sources such as variable time for the recording computer 
to process the parallel port input (probably unquantifiable), and a small amount of drift between 
the clocks of the stimulus computer and the EEG computer (possibly quantifiable, but not 
recorded). 
A faulty T7 electrode during one participant’s session necessitated the removal of that 
channel from that data set. It was interpolated from surrounding electrodes using EEGLAB. 
Software packages. 
Most processing of EEG data was performed using EEGLAB (version 13.3.2; Delorme 
& Makeig, 2004). EEGLAB is an open-source Matlab toolbox for analysing and manipulating 
EEG data. 
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Some source analyses were undertaken using the Exact Low Resolution Brain 
Electromagnetic Tomography (eLORETA) software (version 20141117; Pascual-Marqui, 
2007). This software was developed by the KEY Institute at the University of Zurich and is 
freely available online. eLORETA assembles scalp EEG into a three-dimensional matrix of 
cortical generators consisting of 6239 5mm3 voxels. Localisation by eLORETA is theoretically 
exact, albeit with low spatial resolution. Cross spectra were calculated for frequencies between 
7.5 and 12.5Hz (mu), and between 4 and 7Hz (theta). Spectral activity was then localised using 
eLORETA. 
The localisation of EEG sources is problematic because, although a given set of 
generators yields a single EEG scalp topography, any measured scalp topography could be 
generated by an infinite number of generator patterns (Pascual-Marqui, 1999). This is known 
as an “inverse problem”, and occurs because the EEG signals measured at the scalp do not 
contain enough information about their source for exact localisation. The eLORETA method 
is a discrete, three-dimensionally distributed, linear, weighted minimum norm inverse solution. 
To cut down the number of potential generating patterns source localisation methods make 
assumptions about the pattern of brain activity. The basic assumptions of source localisation 
with eLORETA are that the spectral generators of EEG are located within the cortical grey 
matter, and that the maximally smooth pattern of activity is most likely to be correct. Both 
assumptions are certainly justifiable, the former perhaps more so than the latter. 
Comparisons of eLORETA source localisations between conditions were conducted 
using SnPM, a permutation test more typically associated with fMRI* (see Nichols & Holmes, 
2002). In essence this approach compares the differences found between conditions in the 
experiment with the differences of a number of random labellings of the conditions. The voxel-
                                            
* In fact, any fMRI analysis techniques can be applied to eLORETA data as long as any assumptions of 
the technique hold for voltage generators. It is reasonably straightforward to convert eLORETA outputs to the 
NIfTI-1 format. 
INVESTIGATING SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND REASONING 33 
wise differences between conditions for each permutation of the labels are calculated using the 
researcher’s statistic of choice (log of F-ratio in this study), and ordered by magnitude. The 
likelihood of the actual observed difference at each voxel being due to chance is assessed by 
the ordinal location of the actual difference amongst the permutations. If it is in the top 5%, 
that is equivalent to p<0.05 (or p<0.025 for a one-tailed comparison). Thus the permutation 
technique utilised by SnPM inherently corrects for multiple comparisons. Comparisons in the 
present thesis were performed with 10,000 permutations.  
Results  
Behavioural measures. 
Behavioural measures were averaged for each participant, and compared using paired 
t-tests. Overall, participants responded correctly and within the time limit to 73.1% of trials. 
Response errors were more common for physics problems than social problems (78.8% vs 
67.3% accuracy; p≈0.02). All other comparisons between conditions were not significant. Mean 
accuracy across all participants for all conditions are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Mean Percentage of Correct Responses across All Participants for Each Condition and Combination of 
Conditions  
 Text Video Mean 
Social 74.4 83.3 78.8 
Physics 63.6 70.9 67.3 
Mean 69.0 77.1 73.1 
 
Average reaction time was 3.660s during trials in which a response was offered within 
the 7s time limit. Participants responded significantly slower on physics-video trials compared 
to social-video trials (4.021s vs 3.533s; p<0.01). Response time was also slower during physics-
video trials compared to physics-text trials (4.021s vs 3.383s; p<0.01). All other comparisons 
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between conditions were not significant. Average response times across all participants for all 
conditions are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Mean Response Time (s) across All Participants for Each Condition and Combination of Conditions 
 Text Video Mean 
Social 3.720 3.383 3.547 
Physics 3.534 4.022 3.780 
Mean 3.629 3.689 3.660 
 
Electrophysiological measures. 
Each trial of Experiment 1 was divided into six 4-second epochs. The first five epochs 
occurred during the stimulus presentation period, and the last epoch was during the first 4 
seconds of the question period. 
Spectral analysis. 
Mean log central alpha power (7.5-12.5Hz) recorded at C3 and C4 (left and right 
hemisphere motor areas, respectively) was calculated for each participant for each of the six 4-
second epochs, along with mean log theta power (4-7Hz) recorded at Fz (frontal vertex). 
Comparisons between conditions were made using paired t-tests. 
Central alpha at C3. 
Looking only at text trials, there was no significant difference in central alpha power 
between physics-text and social-text trials prior to presentation of the question (Epoch 6). As 
shown in Figure 7, significantly less central alpha was recorded at C3 during Epoch 6 of social-
text trials compared to physics-text trials (one-tailed p<0.05). Note that in the line graphs, red 
shading effectively denotes the finding of a statistically significant hypothesised difference. 
Green shading indicates a statistically reliable difference that was not hypothesised (but not 
necessarily unexpected). 
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A distinctly different pattern was followed during video trials (see Figure 7). Central 
alpha power at C3 was initially significantly higher during social-video trials compared to 
physics-video trials (p<0.01). This difference became less pronounced over the course of each 
trial, becoming statistically non-significant in Epochs 3 through 5, and reversed direction in 
Epoch 6 (i.e. to the same direction as the text trials). The difference in Epoch 6 approached 
statistical significance (one-tailed p≈0.06). Central alpha power differences between the video 
and text conditions reached statistical significance at C3 in Epochs 1 and 6 (see Figure 8). 
Some statistically significant differences were found when comparing physics and social 
trials. As shown in Figure 9, in early epochs central alpha power at C3 was significantly higher 
during physics trials compared to social trials. The difference became non-significant in Epoch 
3, and reversed to become significant in the opposite direction during Epoch 6 (one-tailed 
p<0.01). 
Central alpha at C4. 
Central alpha power recorded at C4 followed a similar pattern to C3. Activity at the 
two electrodes was highly correlated across all epochs (r≈0.9). This was expected; given the 
proximity of the two electrodes one would expect them to record many of the same sources 
due to volume conduction of the signal. Furthermore, the two sites are homologously 
connected by the corpus callosum.  
As shown in Figure 7, there was largely no statistically significant difference in central 
alpha power between the physics-text and social-text trials at C4 until Epoch 6. In this epoch 
central alpha power was significantly lower in the social-text condition (one-tailed p<0.01). 
The difference was significant in the opposite direction during Epoch 2. 
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Figure 7. Mean log central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) power recorded at C3 and C4 over the course of the six 4-second 
epochs in all conditions. Epochs wherein two conditions significantly differed (p<0.05) are shaded. Green shading 
indicates that significance was found using a two-tailed t-test, red shading indicates a one-tailed t-test. 
 
Figure 8. Mean log central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) power recorded at C3 and C4 over the course of the six 4-second 
epochs in text and video conditions (collapsed across reasoning domain). Epochs wherein two conditions 
significantly differed (two-tailed p<0.05) are shaded green. No one-tailed tests were performed on these data. 
 
Figure 9. Mean log central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) power recorded at C3 and C4 over the course of the six 4-second 
epochs in social and physics conditions (collapsed across stimulus medium). E Epochs wherein two conditions 
significantly differed (p<0.05) are shaded. Green shading indicates that significance was found using a two-tailed 
t-test, red shading indicates a one-tailed t-test. 
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During most epochs central alpha power at C4 was higher in the physics-video 
condition compared to the social-video condition, and this difference was statistically 
significant, or approaching significance, in all but Epoch 3. In Epoch 6 the difference switched 
direction, ending with significantly less central alpha being recorded during the social-video 
condition compared to the physics-video condition (one-tailed p<0.01; see Figure 7). Central 
alpha power at C4 was significantly differed on the basis stimulus medium manipulation only 
in Epoch 2 (p<0.05; see Figure 8). 
As shown in Figure 9, the time course of central alpha power at C4 in the reasoning 
domain comparison followed a similar pattern to that found at C3. During Epochs 1 through 
5 higher central alpha power was recorded at C4 during social trials compared to physics trials 
(statistically significant during Epoch 2; p<0.05). This relationship switched directions in Epoch 
6 to end with significantly less C4 central alpha during the social condition (one-tailed 
p<0.001). 
Theta at Fz. 
As shown in Figure 10, when considering only the text trials, theta power at Fz was 
higher during social-text trials compared to physics-text trials during Epochs 1-4, and lower 
during social-text trials compared to physics-text trials during Epochs 5 and 6. The difference 
reached statistical significance during Epoch 3 (p<0.01) and Epoch 4 (p<0.05). 
Also in Figure 10, during video trials frontal theta power was higher in physics-video 
trials compared to social-video trials across all epochs. This difference reached statistical 
significance during Epoch 4 (p≈0.01).  Frontal theta power appeared to be higher in Epoch 6 
(i.e. during the question period) compared to other epochs, but that relationship did not vary 
on the basis of reasoning domain. 
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Figure 10. Mean log theta (4-7Hz) power recorded at Fz over the course of the six 4-second epochs in all 
conditions. Epochs wherein two conditions significantly differed (two-tailed p<0.05) are shaded.  
 
Figure 11. Mean log theta (4-7Hz) power recorded at Fz over the course of the six 4-second epochs in text and 
video conditions (collapsed across reasoning domain). Epochs containing a significant difference (two-tailed 
p<0.05) are shaded. 
 
Figure 12. Mean log theta (4-7Hz) power recorded at Fz over the course of the six 4-second epochs in social and 
physics conditions (collapsed across stimulus medium). Epochs containing a significant difference (two-tailed 
p<0.05) are shaded. 
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As shown in Figure 12, frontal theta power was lower during physics trials compared 
to social trials across all epochs, significantly so in Epoch 1 (p<0.05) and Epoch 4 (p<0.01). 
Frontal theta power was also significantly lower in video trials compared to text trials during 
all epochs (all p<0.05; see Figure 11) As the significant frontal theta differences were in the 
opposite direction to that hypothesised, eLORETA source localisations of theta were not 
thoroughly analysed. However a cursory analysis indicated that no differences originated in 
frontal areas. 
Source localisation. 
To allow for the more categorical definition of mu from electrode readings of central 
alpha, eLORETA source localisation was performed for each 4-second epoch for each 
participant. Central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) generators over the whole brain were then compared 
using eLORETA’s implementation of Statistical Non-Parametric Mapping (SnPM) with the 
paired log of F-ratio between voxels as the statistic of interest. 
Differences in spectral generators of central alpha activity for the main manipulation 
(reasoning domain) are shown in Figure 13. Overall we see three distinct loci of differences in 
activity. The posterior alpha rhythm is the most obvious (appearing blue in Figure 13). 
Posterior alpha was more powerful during social trials compared to physics trials in Epochs 1 
through 5 (the stimulus presentation period). This pattern was statistically reliable during Epoch 
1 (p<0.05), Epoch 3 (p<0.05), and Epoch 5 (p<0.01) but essentially absent in Epoch 6 (during 
the question period). 
Another source of central alpha differences associated with reasoning domain can be 
observed in the precentral gyrus (Brodmann Area 6), appearing in Figure 13 as bilateral (albeit 
left-hemisphere focused) higher (red-yellow) central alpha in the physics condition during 
Epochs 1-5. This difference was statistically significant in the left hemisphere during Epoch 2 
(one-tailed p<0.001), Epoch 4 (one-tailed p≈0.001), and Epoch 5 (one-tailed p<0.001). 
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The third locus of activity was exclusive to Epoch 6 (see Figure 13f), and appears as a 
distinct band of higher alpha activity in central areas during physics trials. This activity was 
bilaterally distributed around the postcentral gyrus (BA1†). The difference was statistically 
significant in the right hemisphere (one-tailed p<0.01).  
To investigate the significant central alpha differences between video and text trials 
found in some epochs, spectral generators for each epoch were compared. As illustrated in 
Figure 14, there were a number of areas in which central alpha power varied on the basis of 
stimulus medium, often originating from outside central areas. Similarly to the physics vs social 
comparison, there was a change of activation pattern during Epoch 6.  
The most durable difference was found in the precuneus (BA7), which generated 
significantly higher central alpha during video trials compared to text trials in Epochs 1 to 5 
(p<0.05). Significantly higher central alpha was also found originating from central areas 
(primarily in the left hemisphere) during Epochs 1, 2, 4, and 5 (p<0.05). 
There were also areas where significantly more central alpha was generated during text 
trials compared to video trials. This difference was localised to the right lingual gyrus (BA19) 
and middle temporo-occipital junction (BA17) during Epoch 1, and in the left insula (BA13) 
and inferior frontal gyrus (BA45) during Epoch 3. 
During Epoch 6 no statistically reliable difference in cortical generators of central alpha 
on the basis of stimulus medium was found using the eLORETA analysis. Given that a 
significant difference was recorded at C3 for this comparison, the most likely source of this 
observation appears to have been located in the insula (BA13; shown in Figure 15, in a 2D 
multi-plane view).
                                            
†All sources in the postcentral gyrus will be referred to as originating in Brodmann Area 1. Source 
localisation using eLORETA as implemented in this thesis is not likely to be accurate enough to truly differentiate 
between BA3, 1, and 2. 
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Central alpha differences between the physics and social conditions were further 
investigated by separating the video and text trials. As shown in Figure 16 (text) and Figure 17 
(video), central alpha differences between social and physics trials were of greater magnitude in 
the video condition (note the different scales). 
As shown in Figure 16, during text trials there were no differences in central alpha 
generators on the basis of reasoning domain that were reliable over all epochs. Some central 
areas generated higher central alpha during physics-text trials compared to social-text trials 
during Epochs 2, 4, and 6. This difference reached statistical significance (one-tailed p<0.05) 
in central areas focused on the precentral gyrus (BA6) of the right hemisphere during Epoch 2, 
and bilaterally during Epoch 6. The central alpha difference during Epoch 6 was more diffuse, 
extending into the postcentral gyrus (BA1) and inferior parietal lobule (BA40). 
 
Figure 15. Difference in eLORETA source localisation of central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) between video and text trials 
during Epoch 6 (contrast: video minus text). 
As shown in Figure 17, during video trials the pattern of activation differences was 
similar to the overall results (i.e. Figure 13). The higher posterior alpha during social-video 
trials was significant during Epochs 1 to 5 (p<0.05). There was significantly more alpha 
generated in central areas during physics-video trials compared to social-video trials during 
Epochs 2, 3, 4, and 5 (one-tailed p<0.05). This difference was focused on the precentral gyrus  
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(BA6), and statistically reliable only in the left hemisphere. During Epoch 6 higher alpha 
activity in the right precentral gyrus during physics-video trials approached statistical 
significance (one-tailed p<0.1). Combined with the statistically significant difference between 
physics-video and social-video conditions found in electrode-wise comparisons of central alpha 
power at C4, we can conclude that the source of this difference was likely around the precentral 
gyrus. 
Discussion 
The classification of mu implies not only a frequency, but a source. Central alpha 
activity was localised using eLORETA, and classified as mu on the basis of its origin in 
sensorimotor areas (i.e. the precentral and postcentral gyri). Mu activity was also analysed using 
the traditional method of comparing central alpha activity at electrode sites C3 and C4 (left 
and right motor areas respectively). 
There was extensive mu suppression during social reasoning compared to during the 
solving of physics problems. This mu suppression was statistically significant during the first 4 
seconds of the question period. Mu suppression during the question period was found to have 
the largest magnitude in the lateral postcentral gyri, and was somewhat lateralised to the right 
hemisphere. During the question period, mu suppression was more powerful in response to 
text trials. During the question period of video trials significant mu suppression was found only 
in the right hemisphere.  
Mu suppression associated with social reasoning was also detected during the stimulus 
presentation period. This suppression was more defined during video trials, hotspots at lateral 
central areas are more distinct in Figure 17 compared to Figure 16. Interestingly, using the 
traditional spectral analysis at C3 and C4, mu suppression during social-video trials was 
completely masked (and reversed) by a strong posterior alpha rhythm. The strongest mu 
suppression during stimulus presentation was recorded in the left lateral precentral gyrus.  
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Theta (4-7Hz) power recorded at Fz was found not to significantly differ between social 
and physics trials during the first 4 seconds of the question period. During the stimulus 
presentation period higher theta was recorded during social trials compared to video trials. This 
difference reached statistical significance in two of the five stimulus presentation period epochs. 
Preliminary eLORETA source analysis data were not thoroughly analysed. Nevertheless, 
source analysis suggested that the difference did not originate in frontal areas. 
It was hypothesised that there would be mu suppression during social trials in 
comparison to physics trials. This hypothesis was robustly supported. There seemed to be an 
interaction with stimulus medium: mu suppression during video trials was stronger during 
stimulus presentation, but mu suppression during text trials was stronger during the question 
period. 
These results can be accounted for using mirror neuron theory, as mu suppression is 
thought to reflect activity of the purported mirror neuron system (MNS). The pattern of mu 
suppression found in this study indicates that the MNS was recruited for social cognition. 
Furthermore, MNS activity associated with social reasoning differed between video and text 
trials. During video trials MNS activity was strongest while the stimulus was being displayed, 
whereas during text trials MNS activity was more pronounced during the question period. 
Higher MNS engagement during the presentation of video stimuli compared to the text stimuli 
could be due to the richer social information communicated by the video. There were gestures 
and facial expressions to be interpreted during the video clips that were completely absent 
during text trials. During text trials participants may have needed more time to mentally 
construct the scene, thus delaying when they could process its social content. This increased 
requirement for mental reconstruction may have rendered social processing more likely to spill 
over into the question period, causing the observed higher MNS activity during the question 
period of text trials compared to video trials. 
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The results of the present experiment are not particularly supportive of Pineda and 
Hecht’s (2009) proposal that the MNS is the basis of the perceptual system in the componential 
theory of social processing. Mu suppression in the present experiment indicated MNS 
engagement occurred during a task that would be considered to require social-cognitive 
processing. Although it is true that we might expect more MNS engagement during the social-
video condition on account of emotion processing, there were also indications of MNS activity 
during processing of social reasoning problems presented as text. This was evident during the 
stimulus presentation period of the text trials, and the question period of both text and video 
trials. Nothing that we might consider perceptual social information was presented during these 
periods; therefore the data do not support the view that the MNS is completely divorced from 
more cognitive social reasoning. 
MNS activity during social reasoning is consistent with, and extends, the findings of 
Oberman and colleagues (2007). They found evidence for MNS activity while participants 
watched a group of people throwing balls to each other.  The present study found more MNS 
activity while participants performed a social reasoning task compared to while they solved a 
physics problem. There was essentially no perceptual object-directed component in stimuli 
from either reasoning domain; if anything there was more likely to be object-directed actions 
in the physics video stimuli. The finding of relative mu suppression during social reasoning 
provides further evidence that the human MNS is involved in the processing of intransitive 
actions. 
Although the stimuli were validated in a previous study, there remains the possibility 
that some social reasoning associated mu suppression was evoked by the physics stimuli. The 
physics-video stimuli had people demonstrating physical principles, in addition to voiceovers. 
This action-observation during the physics-video trials may have reduced the mu contrast 
between the physics-video and social-video trials. More suitable stimuli could be devised with 
no social or action components. There was also action language in the physics text vignettes, 
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which may have also suppressed the participants’ mu rhythm (Moreno, de Vega, & León, 
2013), however it may not be possible to eliminate this with textual stimuli. Furthermore, this 
mu suppression would hopefully be balanced by a corresponding number of action words in 
the social-text vignettes. 
It was also hypothesised that frontal theta suppression, as a reflection of default-mode 
network (DMN), would be lower during social trials than physics trials. This hypothesis was 
not supported. There was no difference in frontal theta during the question period, and during 
the stimulus presentation period frontal theta was actually lower during physics trials. 
The lack of the predicted difference in frontal theta suggests that either suppression of 
frontal theta is not indicative of DMN activity (as proposed by Scheeringa et al., 2008); or that 
the DMN is not recruited for social reasoning (as proposed by Jack, Dawson, Begany, et al., 
2013). It seems more likely that frontal theta is not a signature of DMN disengagement, given 
the inconsistent reports of EEG DMN correlates (e.g. Chen et al., 2008). 
It is possible that the much stronger posterior alpha rhythm recorded during social-
video trials compared to physics-video trials reflects DMN activity. This is plausible, given that 
the posterior alpha is probably the best known pattern of resting-state EEG activity. Posterior 
alpha as DMN activity is also consistent with the conclusions of Knyazev and colleagues (2011).  
The results from the text trials of this experiment, however, fail to support an EEG 
model of DMN activity as posterior alpha. Although Jack and colleagues (2013) found that 
DMN activity associated with social reasoning was stronger in response to video trials, there 
was still an effect during text trials. The present experiment did not find significant posterior 
alpha associated with social reasoning during text trials. This discrepancy could be due to 
differences in the sensitivities of the EEG and fMRI methodologies. For instance, less DMN 
activity as measured by fMRI could be associated with less synchronous firing of neurons, a 
pattern that could obliterate posterior alpha as recorded by EEG. 
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It is also possible that the difference in posterior alpha observed during video trials was 
due to more subtle confounding factors that varied with reasoning domain. Aside from the 
higher resolution of the physics videos compared to the social videos, it is likely that the 
participants found the physics videos more novel. The social videos were relatively formulaic, 
in that they were always a conversation between a male and a female, whereas the physics 
videos contained a wider variety of content. Suppression of posterior alpha is widely accepted 
to be associated with attention (Klimesch, Doppelmayr, Russegger, Pachinger, & Schwaiger, 
1998), and it is plausible that the physics videos demanded more attention than the social videos. 
Whether this slight difference in stimulus would cause such a large difference in evoked alpha 
is arguable. However, there was no posterior alpha difference during the question period (when 
stimuli did not differ between conditions), further indicating an attentional account for 
posterior alpha differences. Nevertheless, there was robust mu suppression associated with social 
reasoning during the video stimulus presentation period, indicating that perhaps the bulk of 
social cognition occurred before the question.  
The uncertainty of whether the observed posterior alpha reflects DMN activity is 
perhaps indicative of a more basic problem with researching non-rest functions of the DMN. 
It will always be difficult to match different classes of stimulus on the basis of attention, and 
DMN activity is fundamentally affected by attention. This greatly complicates the drawing of 
strong conclusions from differences between classes of stimuli. However, differences in 
attention need not be caused solely by confounding factors like attentional demands – attention 
may be affected by task-related demands. Perhaps the difference in DMN function is simply 
because social stimuli inherently require less conscious attention than physics stimuli, and the 
higher DMN activity reflects the ‘shedding’ of excess attention. Under this model of the DMN 
during social reasoning, the actual social processing could well occur in other more specialised 
systems of the brain, with the DMN only acting to suppress outwards, conscious attention 
(such as that required for physics problems). The purported MNS is an obvious candidate for 
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such a system, if somewhat affected by the availability heuristic. It seems inherently unlikely 
that the entirety of the social cognition process would be captured in a 5Hz window of EEG 
data), but there are plenty of other neural systems that have also been proposed to play a part 
in social reasoning. 
Almost as an aside, the present experiment vividly illustrates the shortcomings of the 
standard mu detection procedure. Comparing mean log central alpha power at C3 and C4 
between physics-video and social-video trials revealed what appeared to be anomalous 
significant mu suppression in the physics condition. Source localisation was performed using 
eLORETA and this difference was found to be entirely due to stronger posterior alpha activity 
during the social condition. This could be particularly problematic if DMN activity is indeed 
associated with posterior alpha and social cognition. It is advised that source localisation be 
applied to candidate mu data, and the present experiment has shown eLORETA to be a viable 
technique for detecting mu suppression. The concordance of the electrode-wise spectral power 
and eLORETA analyses is further discussed in the General Discussion (see page 95). 
To conclude the present experiment, mu suppression data suggest that social reasoning 
was associated with mirror neuron system (MNS) activity. This detection of MNS activity 
extends the current literature by demonstrating mu suppression during non-object-directed, 
deliberative social cognition. In addition comparisons of eLORETA images localised the 
difference to the post central gyri bilaterally. Support for default-mode network (DMN) 
engagement during social cognition was less clear, partly due to uncertainty over what EEG 
correlates should have been expected. There was no evidence of frontal theta suppression (our 
chosen correlate) during social reasoning trials, but there was a distinctive elevated posterior 
alpha rhythm during processing of social video. It is suggested that posterior alpha could reflect 
the DMN activity detected by Jack and colleagues (2013). 
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Chapter 3: Emotion Recognition from Facial Expressions 
Experiment 1 detected mirror neuron system (MNS) activity by measuring mu 
suppression using electroencephalography (EEG) during a deliberative social reasoning task. 
Mu suppression was detected at electrode sites C3 and C4, and was localised using eLORETA 
to the postcentral gyri. Differences in frontal theta activity reflective of default-mode network 
(DMN) activity were not detected. 
Given the doubts as to whether we would expect MNS activation during the 
deliberative social reasoning task of Experiment 1, it was thought prudent to check that the 
somewhat novel techniques used in this thesis were indeed suitable for detecting mu 
suppression as it has traditionally been defined. Experiment 2 sought to further investigate the 
mu rhythm (and the DMN) using a protocol based on a perceptual task more definitively 
thought to engage the MNS: emotion recognition. Aside from direct evidence from macaques 
that some mirror neurons are sensitive to communicative facial gestures (Ferrari, Rozzi, & 
Fogassi, 2005), there is also a body of evidence suggesting that the MNS is involved in emotion 
recognition from facial expressions in humans (Moore et al., 2012; van der Gaag, Minderaa, & 
Keysers, 2007). 
Using fMRI, van der Gaag, Minderaa, and Keysers (2007) investigated MNS response 
to observation of emotional facial expressions. Participants were shown video of actors 
performing facial expressions of three emotions: happiness, disgust, fear, and a neutral 
expression. Participants were asked to simply observe the expression for one block of trials, to 
match the expression to another in the following block, and to imitate the expression in the 
final block. It was found that simple observation of the facial expression video resulted in 
comprehensive activation of areas in the MNS that were also activated while the expression 
was imitated. These areas included the inferior frontal gyrus and sensorimotor areas. 
Furthermore, greater activation was found as the task became more active: imitation elicited 
INVESTIGATING SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND REASONING 51 
the most MNS activation, and observation the least. Matching the expression to a picture of 
another expression evoked an intermediate amount of MNS activity. 
Moore, Gorodnitsky, and Pineda (2012) used EEG to investigate mu suppression 
during observation of facial expressions. EEG was recorded from participants while they viewed 
static images of facial expressions (happy or disgusted), buildings, or visual noise. Data from the 
visual noise trials were rejected, as they included substantial noise from posterior alpha. This 
posterior alpha difference was possibly due to differences in attentional demands between the 
visual noise and other conditions. Data were analysed using independent components analysis 
(ICA), and left and right mu components were identified for each participant. It was found that 
activity in the mu components was significantly lower when participants viewed facial 
expressions compared to when they viewed buildings, indicating that the MNS was activated 
when participants viewed faces. 
These studies indicate that the MNS is involved in facial processing. The present 
experiment aimed to use EEG to investigate mu suppression during emotion processing, and 
to investigate the possibility of DMN activity during the same task. Participants viewed still 
images of a wide range of facial expressions, and were asked either to passively observe the 
expression, or to match its associated emotion from four textual options using a button press. 
As a control task emotion words were also presented, and participants either observed them, 
or matched them. 
It was hypothesised that there would be more mu suppression during observation of 
facial expressions compared to observation of words. It was also predicted that the matching 
task for both faces and words would evoke more mu suppression than the corresponding 
observation tasks. This suppression would be partly due to the motor activity associated with 
selecting a response, but it was also hypothesised that the difference in mu suppression between 
matching and observation would be larger in response to facial expressions. Such a difference 
would indicate some MNS involvement in emotion recognition from facial expressions. 
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With regards to DMN activity, it was hypothesised that more frontal theta suppression 
would be observed during facial expression matching than during word matching, reflecting 
the DMN’s role in social cognition. 
Method 
Participants. 
The same 20 participants were used in all experiments in this thesis. During the analysis of 
Experiment 2 one participant’s data were flagged as erroneous by the trigger correction 
algorithm and, on inspection, this dataset was excluded, leaving a total of 19 participants’ usable 
datasets. Participants were 12 females and 7 males, ranging from 18-25 years old (m=21.35). 
Additional participant details are included the method section of Experiment 1 (see page 22). 
Materials. 
In addition to the shared materials outlined in the method section of Experiment 1 (see 
page 23), Experiment 2 used the Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expression Set (ADFES). The 
ADFES is a validated (Schalk, Hawk, Fischer, & Doosje, 2011) stimulus set that contains both 
video and still images of 22 actors (10 female, 12 male) portraying facial expressions associated 
with nine emotions: anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise, contempt, pride, and 
embarrassment, and a neutral expression. The ADFES is freely available for academic use from 
the Psychology Research Unit at the University of Amsterdam. The present experiment used 
the ADFES’ full complement of 216 still images (4 images are missing), presented at a size of 
720×576 pixels. Names of the 10 expressions contained in the ADFES were used during 
control trials. 
Procedure. 
Experiment 2 was presented as a choice reaction time task. Participants viewed still 
images of facial expressions from the ADFES, and were asked to either match the expression 
to one of four options as quickly as possible, or to simply observe the face. As a control task 
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participants were asked to do a similar task with words, either matching to an identical word 
or passively observing. The two manipulations were trial task and stimulus medium, and each 
had two levels (trial task: observe, match; stimulus medium: word, picture). The combinations 
of these manipulations resulted in four conditions: observe-text, observe-picture, match-text, 
and match-picture. The procedure is illustrated in Figure 18. 
During each trial the participant was first presented with the four response options (or 
a cue to observe) near the bottom of the screen (the prompt period). After 4 seconds the 
stimulus appeared in the centre of the screen and remained for 6 seconds (the stimulus 
presentation period). The options were presented before the stimulus to minimise the need for 
eye movements after stimulus presentation. During matching trials participants responded using 
the response box (described on page 25). The participant’s response was highlighted blue, and 
was unable to be changed. 
Trials were presented in random order in 15 four-trial blocks with a 10 second fixation 
period between each block. Adjacent trials (i.e. not fixation periods) were separated by a 
fixation period of random duration (mean=3s, SD=0.75s). Eight practice trials (two of each 
condition) were presented at the start of the experiment with instructions. 
Analysis. 
Data for Experiment 2 were analysed using the same methods as Experiment 1 (see 
page 29), albeit with a different epoching strategy (outlined below). 
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Results 
Behavioural measures. 
Behavioural measures were averaged for each participant, and compared using paired 
t-tests. Overall the picture emotion identification task was significantly more difficult for 
participants than the word matching task. Reaction times for the emotion identification task 
were significantly longer (2.234s vs 1.289s; p≪0.0001), and the percentage of correct responses 
was significantly lower (71.2% vs 90.9%; p<0.001). 
Electrophysiological measures. 
The first 8-seconds of each 10-second trial was divided into four 2-second epochs. The 
first three of these epochs were taken from the prompt period. The fourth epoch was taken 
from the first 2 seconds of the stimulus presentation period. 
Spectral analysis. 
Using the same technique as Experiment 1, mean log central alpha power (7.5-12.5Hz) 
recorded at C3 and C4 (left and right hemisphere motor areas, respectively) was calculated for 
each participant for each of the four 2-second epochs, along with mean log theta power (4-
7Hz) recorded at Fz (frontal vertex). Comparisons between conditions were made using paired 
t-tests. 
Central alpha. 
As shown in Figure 20, the first three epochs exhibited steadily rising central alpha 
power at C3 and C4. Significantly higher central alpha power was recorded in the observation 
condition (where a single ‘Observe’ prompt was displayed) compared to the matching 
condition (where four options were displayed; all p<0.01). As shown in Figure 21, there was 
no statistically significant difference in central alpha power between the picture and word 
conditions during the first three epochs (although the difference did approach significance at 
C3 during Epoch 1, p≈0.054). 
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Figure 19. Mean log central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) power recorded at C3 and C4 over the course of the four 2-
second epochs in all conditions. Epochs wherein two conditions significantly differed (p<0.05) are shaded. Green 
shading indicates that significance was found using a two-tailed t-test, red shading indicates a one-tailed t-test. 
 
Figure 20. Mean log central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) power recorded at C3 and C4 over the course of the six 4-second 
epochs in match and observe conditions (collapsed over stimulus type). Epochs wherein two conditions 
significantly differed (p<0.05) are shaded. Green shading indicates that significance was found using a two-tailed 
t-test, red shading indicates a one-tailed t-test. 
 
Figure 21. Mean log central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) power recorded at C3 and C4 over the course of the four 2-
second epochs in picture and word conditions (collapsed across trial task). Epochs wherein two conditions 
significantly differed (one-tailed p<0.05) are shaded red. 
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A change in this pattern of activation was observed in Epoch 4. Overall central alpha 
at both sites dropped. There remained no statistically significant difference between the picture-
observation and word-observation trials, and significantly higher central alpha during the 
observation trials compared to the matching trials measured at both sites (both p<0.01). During 
the picture-matching trials, however, there was significantly lower central alpha measured at 
both C3 and C4 compared to word-matching trials (both one-tailed p<0.0001). 
Frontal theta. 
Log mean theta power at Fz was also assessed during the 2-second epochs. Frontal theta 
power did not differ between any conditions during the first three epochs. As shown in Figure 
23, during Epoch 4 significantly more frontal theta power was recorded in matching trials 
compared to observation trials (p≈0.001). Figure 22 illustrates that this difference did not vary 
with stimulus medium. As shown in Figure 24, there were no significant differences in frontal 
theta power between picture and word conditions during any epochs. A cursory source 
localisation for frontal theta was performed using eLORETA and also indicated no distinct 
frontal source. 
 
Figure 22. Mean log theta (4-7Hz) power at Fz over the course of the four 2-second epochs in all conditions. 
Epochs wherein two conditions significantly differed (two-tailed p<0.05) are shaded green. 
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Figure 23. Mean log theta (4-7Hz) power at Fz over the course of the four 2-second epochs in match and observe 
conditions (collapsed across stimulus medium). Epochs wherein two conditions significantly differed (two-tailed 
p<0.05) are shaded green. 
 
Figure 24. Mean log theta (4-7Hz) power at Fz over the course of the four 2-second epochs in picture and word 
conditions (collapsed across trial task). No statistically significant differences were found. 
Source localisation.  
Using the same method as Experiment 2, eLORETA source localisation was performed 
for each 2-second epoch for each participant. Central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) generators over the 
whole brain were then compared using eLORETA’s implementation of Statistical Non-
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Parametric Mapping (SnPM) with the paired log of F-ratio between voxels as the statistic of 
interest. 
Sources of central alpha power differences between the picture-observation and word-
observation conditions were investigated first. Statistically reliable differences were found in 
central areas, and right temporo-occipital regions. As shown in Figure 25, there was less central 
alpha originating from central areas in the picture-observation condition compared to the 
word-observation condition. This difference was significant (one-tailed p<0.05) over a large 
volume, including the right precentral gyrus (BA4), the postcentral gyri bilaterally (BA1), in 
addition to the adjacent inferior parietal lobules (BA40) and superior and middle frontal gyri 
(BA6, BA8).  
 
Figure 25. Difference in eLORETA source localisations of central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) between word-observation 
and picture-observation trials (contrast: word observe minus picture observe). Areas in which the difference was 
found to be statistically significant using SnPM are indicated with a shadow underlaid on the background. 
Significant differences in central alpha generators were also found in right temporo-
occipital regions. This difference was investigated further using the general definition of alpha 
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(8-15Hz) on account of its distance from mu-generating regions. The difference, illustrated in 
Figure 26 was found to be significant (p<0.05) over a large area in the right hemisphere 
consisting of the entire posterior half of the temporal lobe and adjacent areas in the occipital 
and limbic lobes. Areas of significant difference in the right occipital lobe included the fusiform 
gyrus (BA19) and the lingual gyrus (BA18). Areas of significant difference in the limbic lobe 
included the parahippocampal gyrus (BA17) and the posterior cingulate (BA10). 
 
Figure 26. Temporal lobe difference in alpha (8-14Hz) generation between word-observation and picture-
observation trials (contrast: word observe minus picture observe). 
During the initial three 2-second epochs, significantly lower central alpha power was 
recorded at C3 and C4 during observation trials compared to matching trials. Initial source 
analyses suggested that this difference did not originate in central areas, so source localisation 
was performed using the broader alpha definition (8-15Hz).  
As shown in Figure 27, there was more alpha generated in posterior regions during 
observation trials compared to matching trials. This difference was significant in all three epochs 
(all p<0.01), and was centred on the precuneus (BA7) during Epochs 2 and 3. During Epoch 
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1 the greatest difference was localised to the right posterior insula (BA13), although there were 
extensive areas of significant difference in central and left inferior occipital areas (BA19), as well 
as around the right temporo-parietal junction (BA12).  
There was also significantly less alpha generated in frontal regions during observation 
trials compared to matching trials during these first three epochs. This difference was significant 
during Epoch 1 (p<0.01) and Epoch 2 (p<0.05).  
 
Figure 27. Differences in alpha (8-15Hz) between observation and matching trial eLORETA source localisations 
during the first three 2-second epochs (contrast: observe minus match). Areas in which the difference was found 
to be statistically significant using SnPM are indicated with a shadow underlaid on the background. 
For Epoch 4 the difference in cortical generators between the observation and matching 
conditions (the observe-match ratio) during the word condition was compared to the same 
difference during the picture condition. The observe-match ratio can be thought of as the extra 
central alpha suppression not explained by the viewing of the stimulus. 
First observe-match ratios were separately calculated for picture and word trials during 
Epoch 4. It was found that the source of the observe-match difference was mainly generated 
bilaterally around the postcentral gyrus during both picture and word trials (BA1; see Figure 
28). This difference was found to be significant during both the picture and word conditions. 
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Areas of significant difference are illustrated in Figure 29 for the picture stimuli, and Figure 30 
for word stimuli. 
Areas of significant observe-match ratio during picture trials were larger in magnitude, 
and more extensive than those found in word trials. Areas of significant observe-match ratio 
during picture trials were localised to lateral central areas. As shown in Figure 29, this 
suppression was largest bilaterally in the inferior parietal lobules (BA40) and the adjacent 
postcentral gyri (BA1).  
Areas of significant observe-match ratio during word trials were also distributed around 
lateral central areas. The central alpha suppression during word trials was distinctly lateralised 
to the left hemisphere. The largest difference was localised to the sub-gyral area below the left 
postcentral gyrus (BA1). 
 
Figure 28. Observe-match ratio of central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) from the 2s post-stimulus epoch (contrast: picture-
observe minus picture-match; word-observe minus word-match). Areas in which the difference was found to be 
statistically significant using SnPM are indicated with a shadow underlaid on the background. 
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Figure 29. Areas of significant central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) observe-match ratio in the picture condition during the 
2s post-stimulus epoch (contrast: picture-match minus picture-observe). (a) Shows differences significant at one-
tailed p<0.05. (b) Shows differences significant at one-tailed p<0.01. 
 
Figure 30. Areas of significant central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) observe-match ratio in the picture condition during the 
2s post-stimulus epoch (contrast: picture-match minus picture-observe). (a) Shows differences significant at one-
tailed p<0.05. (b) Shows differences significant at one-tailed p<0.01. 
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For a more direct comparison between the picture and word conditions, and to subtract 
out the effect of the difference in motor response, the observe-match ratio of the post-stimulus 
epoch was compared between picture and word conditions (see Figure 31). Assuming that the 
MNS is not involved in the matching of words, the observe-match ratio of the word trials 
quantifies the mu suppression associated with the motor activity of the matching task. The 
observe-match ratio of the picture trials quantifies the sum of the mu suppression associated 
with the matching task and that involved with identifying the emotion. Subtracting the 
observe-match ratio of the word trials from the observe-match ratio of the picture trials leaves 
only the mu suppression associated with the emotion identification component of the matching 
task. This difference was largely localised to central areas bilaterally, and was statistically 
significant (one-tailed p<0.05) in a small area centred on the right postcentral gyrus (BA1) and 
adjacent inferior parietal lobule (BA40). The difference also approached significance in the left 
postcentral gyrus (one-tailed p≈0.055).  
 
Figure 31. Observe-match ratio of alpha (8-15Hz) from the 2s post-stimulus epoch during word trials subtracted 
from the same ratio during picture trials (contrast: [picture-observe minus picture-match] minus [word-observe 
minus word-match]). Areas in which the difference was found to be statistically significant using SnPM are 
indicated with a shadow underlaid on the background. 
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Discussion 
No statistically significant difference in central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) was recorded from 
electrodes over motor areas during observation of faces compared to words. Nevertheless, 
eLORETA source localisation was performed and statistically reliable mu suppression was 
found. This mu suppression was localised to the postcentral gyri bilaterally, and the surrounding 
right precentral gyrus, inferior parietal lobules and superior and middle frontal gyri. There were 
also areas of greater alpha activity during word observation in right temporo-occipital regions, 
which had presumably masked the mu suppression from central areas. 
Significant mu suppression was recorded while participants were performing the 
matching task compared to passive observation, regardless of stimulus medium. Mu activity 
during observation trials was subtracted from activity during matching trials in order to factor 
out activity associated with the different visual stimulation. There was significant mu 
suppression in the postcentral gyrus regardless of stimulus medium. However, this mu 
suppression was more powerful during picture trials compared to word trials. During word 
trials mu suppression was lateralised to the left hemisphere, whereas during picture trials there 
was no strong evidence of lateralisation. 
To focus on the effect of the emotion recognition task, the difference in match-observe 
ratio between picture and word trials was calculated. This subtracted the effect of the button 
press (shared across stimulus medium), leaving only the activity associated specifically with 
identifying emotion from facial expressions. This analysis indicated that mu suppression in the 
right postcentral gyrus was associated with emotion recognition, although the difference also 
approached significance in the left hemisphere. 
The difference in central alpha activity between match and observe conditions during 
the 6-second pre-stimulus prompt period was also investigated. This difference was found to 
originate from outside the central areas, and as such source localisation was performed on 
general alpha (8-14Hz) instead of the more restricted central alpha. Significantly more alpha 
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was recorded from frontal regions during matching trials compared to observation trials, and 
more posterior alpha during observation trials compared to matching trials. Unsurprisingly, no 
central alpha differences between picture and word trials were recorded during the prompt 
period – the two trial tasks did not differ on the basis of stimulus medium before stimulus 
presentation. 
Theta (4-7Hz) power measured at Fz did not vary on the basis of stimulus medium. 
There was a significant effect of trial task during the stimulus presentation period, with more 
theta recorded at Fz during matching trials. Source localisation indicated no differences in 
frontal theta between conditions, and these data were not presented. 
 Hypotheses regarding mu suppression were broadly supported. As predicted, there was 
significant mu suppression while viewing faces compared to words. This finding replicates 
previous studies that have found mu suppression in response to viewing faces (Moore et al., 
2012), and is consistent with research indicating mirror neuron system (MNS) involvement in 
facial processing (Enticott, Johnston, & Herring, 2008; van der Gaag et al., 2007). There were 
also some areas around the temporo-occipital region from which more alpha activity was 
generated during the word condition. Although this is biologically plausible as indicative of 
word processing (the sources included lingual and fusiform gyri), there is no precedent for this 
area specifically generating alpha during word processing. Furthermore it is likely that alpha 
activity from this region would be confounded by posterior alpha due to differences in visual 
attention demands between picture and word stimuli. 
It was also hypothesised that more mu suppression would be recorded while participants 
performed the matching task compared to the observation task regardless of stimulus medium. 
This hypothesis was supported, likely at least in part due to the difference in motor response 
between conditions. For the identification task participants responded with their finger, 
whereas no response was required for the observation trials. The left lateralisation of mu 
suppression in the word matching task is perhaps more surprising, given that both hands were 
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used to respond. Movement-associated mu suppression has been found to occur most strongly 
in the contralateral hemisphere (Perry & Bentin, 2009), or without strong lateralisation. The 
deviation from the literature found in the present study may have been due to the presence of 
emotional cues increasing variance in the activity of the right hemisphere MNS. For instance, 
the randomly interspersed facial expression matching trials may have caused highly variable 
higher-than-baseline activity in the right MNS during word matching trials. This effect could 
have been exacerbated by the word stimuli being emotion words, perhaps more strongly 
evoking activation based on priming from previous picture trials. Increased variance would 
reduce the power of statistical comparisons to find significant differences. There could also be 
an effect of handedness, all participants but one were right-handed, perhaps resulting in stronger 
motor activity associated with finger movements in the left hemisphere.  
It was further hypothesised that there would be mu suppression during identification 
of facial expressions beyond what could be explained by the presence of motor activity. This 
hypothesis was also supported: more mu suppression was recorded emanating bilaterally from 
the postcentral gyri during the picture matching task compared to the word matching task. 
This difference was statistically significant in a very small area of the right postcentral gyrus and 
inferior parietal lobule, further implicating the MNS in the processing of emotion, consistent 
with previous research (e.g. Moore et al., 2012; van der Gaag et al., 2007). The lateralisation 
is also consistent with literature indicating that MNS activity during facial processing is 
lateralised to the right hemisphere (Leslie, Johnson-Frey, & Grafton, 2004), and the general 
tendency of emotion processing to be right-hemisphere lateralised (Campbell, 1982).No 
hypotheses were devised regarding activity during the prompt period, but highly significant 
differences were found between matching and observation trials. The concrete difference 
between the two task types during this period was that in the matching trials four options were 
presented, whereas in the observation trials only the word ‘Observe’ was presented. This 
discrepancy may have meant more desynchronisation of posterior alpha during the prompt 
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period of matching trials due to shifts in visual attention. The areas of greater activity during 
matching trials in frontal areas are not particularly interpretable, and are likely due to noise 
stemming from the differences in ocular activity between the two prompts. 
No evidence for the hypothesised frontal theta correlate of DMN activity was found; 
theta at Fz did not vary on the basis of stimulus medium. This lack of a difference is difficult to 
interpret by itself, but will be discussed further in conjunction with other results in the General 
Discussion. 
The statistical comparison of mu suppression between the facial expression and word 
matching tasks could have been undertaken using a more sensitive test restricted to the 
sensorimotor regions of interest. Such an analysis would likely have found a larger volume of 
significance, including the left postcentral gyrus, and would have been easily justifiable given 
the hypotheses of this experiment. Nonetheless, the findings from the whole-brain analysis are 
perhaps more convincing in that they show that not only was there a statistically significant 
difference in mu suppression in the somatosensory regions, but that the difference was exclusive 
to the somatosensory regions. 
Experiment 2 successfully demonstrated mu suppression while participants identified a 
facial expression from a list of emotions. Moreover, source localisation indicated that this mu 
suppression was lateralised to the right hemisphere. These findings are consistent with the 
proposal that the human mirror-neuron system (MNS) is activated during processing of facial 
expressions, a crucial element of social cognition.  
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Chapter 4: Imitation of Facial Expressions 
Although Experiment 2 implicated the mirror-neuron system (MNS) in facial 
processing, the methodology was arguably inorganic. We do not typically encounter static facial 
expressions, and when we do encounter facial expressions, our task is not typically to explicitly 
identify their associated emotion. Rather, we generally process the emotion implicitly, and 
respond non-verbally by modifying our behaviour. We would therefore expect more MNS 
activation during a task that closer resembles the social interactions that we experience on a 
day-to-day basis. 
The capacity for imitation is one social-cognitive ability that separates higher primates 
from less socially advanced forms of life (Whiten, 2011). Imitation is, at its shallowest, the 
replication of the behaviour of another. Research into imitation has implicated the proposed 
MNS areas of the human brain. Iacoboni and colleagues (1999) used fMRI to investigate brain 
activity while participants were prompted to lift either the index or middle finger of their right 
hand in response to three different classes of prompting stimulus (illustrated in Figure 32). The 
prompting stimulus varied in similarity to the participants’ finger-lifting response. In the 
imitative condition the participants viewed a video of a lifting finger (Figure 32a). In the 
symbolic instruction condition the hand was presented as a still image with a cross to indicate 
which finger to lift (Figure 32b). Lastly, in the spatial instruction condition participants saw a 
grey rectangle with an off-centre cross that indicated which finger to lift with its position 
(Figure 32c). There was also an observation-only condition where the participants viewed the 
prompting stimulus, but gave no motor response. The authors hypothesised that there would 
be activation in areas associated with finger movement regardless of how it was evoked, and 
that this activation would be stronger if the action was elicited by imitation. Such a pattern of 
activation was found in two areas: the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus (i.e. Broca’s 
area), and the right anterior parietal region. Broca’s area in humans is considered the equivalent 
of F5 in macaques (Agam, Bullock, & Sekuler, 2005), providing a strong link between the 
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human and monkey data sets. The authors suggested that the two regions may be involved in 
different parts of the imitation process, with Broca’s area responsible for encoding the motor 
goal, and the anterior parietal region describing the motor movements required to accomplish 
the goal. This function of the right anterior parietal region may be a factor in the imitation 
advantages that humans hold over other primates (Whiten, 2011).  
 
Figure 32. Examples of the three stimulus types used by Iacoboni and colleagues (1999). (a) An animation of a 
hand with a finger lifting (the index finger in this case). (b) A still image of a hand with a cross indicating which 
finger to lift (the middle finger in this case). (c) A rectangle with a cross indicating which finger to lift (the index 
finger in this case). 
However, not all studies have found such categorical results with regards to MNS 
activity during imitation. Molenberghs, Cunnington, and Mattingley (2009) found that, across 
20 fMRI studies, the most consistently activated sites during imitation were the inferior and 
superior parietal lobules, and the dorsal premotor cortex. Of these, only the inferior parietal 
lobule is widely considered part of the MNS (Moore et al., 2012). The inferior frontal gyrus 
was found not to be consistently activated during imitation, calling into question the model of 
imitation established by Iacoboni and colleagues (1999), and illustrating the lack of concurrence 
that exists in the current literature. 
There are also findings to indicate that the human MNS could be involved in the 
imitation of facial expressions. This proposal is plausible, given the automatic social processing 
and emotion recognition that must be associated with such a task. Humans tend to rapidly and 
automatically react to the observation of emotional expressions; on being smiled at by a 
stranger, it is typical for one to feel compelled to smile back (see Bastiaansen, Thioux, & 
Keysers, 2009). Although in the case of a smile the response is simple imitation, the tendency 
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to imitate is not universal among emotions. If one views an angry face, then fear is often a 
more appropriate response. Indeed, this pattern is borne out by data suggesting increased facial 
fear response to images of angry faces when participants are in an induced fear state, compared 
to responses to neutral faces (Moody, McIntosh, Mann, & Weisser, 2007). Additionally, it has 
been found that the tendency to imitate an observed smile can be influenced by social factors, 
like the characteristics of the relationship between the mimicker and mimickee (van Baaren, 
Janssen, Chartrand, & Dijksterhuis, 2009). These findings indicate that autonomic facial 
responses in response to observation of facial expressions are not simply the result of an imitative 
circuit between the visual and motor areas, but a more complex system that is mediated by 
emotion centres. It could be further inferred that such a circuit involves a subsystem responsible 
for the ascertainment of the observed emotion – potentially a role for the MNS. 
Lee and colleagues (2006) investigated brain activity during imitation of facial 
expressions. Eighteen right-handed participants either observed a facial expression, or observed 
and imitated it. Activity in response to a range of emotions (sadness, anger, joy) and ingestive 
(chewing and licking) actions was assessed using fMRI, and facial response was measured using 
computer analysis of fiduciary markers (i.e. adhesive reflective dots attached to the face). 
Imitation of facial expressions was associated with activity primarily in the right inferior 
prefrontal cortex, but also the medial prefrontal gyrus, anterior cingulate cortex, and superior 
temporal gyrus. Magnitude of facial response was associated with activity in the right insular 
and premotor cortices. Exploratory analysis found that regions of activation during imitation 
varied across emotions, perhaps indicating that the imitation of facial expressions may not be 
explained by a model as simple as the MNS. Additionally, no evidence for activation of the 
MNS was found during observation of a facial expression. This result contradicts the findings 
of Experiment 2 of this thesis, which found significant mu suppression (the EEG analogue of 
MNS activity) in response to observing facial expressions, as well as other studies in the fMRI 
literature (e.g. Dapretto et al., 2005; Ferrari et al., 2005).  
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Dapretto and colleagues (2005) used fMRI to investigate MNS activity in children 
(mean age 12 years old), with a focus on autism spectrum disorder. Participants were shown 
images of facial expressions (anger, fear, happiness, sadness, plus neutral), and either imitated or 
observed them. Fixation periods were included as a control. It was found that during imitation 
neurotypical participants exhibited bilateral activation in the pars opercularis of the inferior 
frontal gyrus, an area previously implicated in the MNS. Additional activation was found in 
the adjacent pars triangularis, as well as face areas, motor and premotor areas, limbic structures, 
and the cerebellum. One limitation of this study was that the comparison between activity 
during imitation and observation does not allow us to distinguish whether the detected MNS 
activity was due to imitation specifically, or if the MNS was activated simply by the motor 
activity associated with producing a facial expression. This limitation is widespread across the 
literature. Nevertheless, Dapretto and colleagues (2005) demonstrated MNS activity during 
facial motor activity over and above that of passive facial processing.  
Horan and colleagues (2014) used fMRI to investigate MNS activity during imitation 
in a group of neurotypical controls, in addition to individuals with schizophrenia. The paradigm 
was similar to that of Dapretto and colleagues (2005), with the addition of an ‘execution’ 
condition in which participants produced a facial expression in response to a visually-presented 
verbal prompt. Although they focused on differences between the neurotypical and 
schizophrenia groups, some general conclusions can be gleaned from their results. Patterns of 
activation were similar between execution and imitation trials. There was extensive activation 
of the prefrontal, premotor, inferior parietal, superior parietal, and occipital cortices in both 
conditions. Occipital activity was greater during the imitate condition compared to the execute 
condition. The execution task evoked higher activity in the basal ganglia, anterior cingulate 
cortex, and middle temporal gyrus. It is notable that there did not seem to be any difference 
between execute and imitate conditions in established MNS regions, whereas we would expect 
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to see more MNS activity during the imitation task if it is indeed heavily involved in social 
processing and imitation.  
MNS activity during imitation has not been studied particularly often using 
electroencephalography (EEG). In fact, there has been no prominent research directly linking 
imitation with mu suppression. Currently the most concrete links between imitation and mu 
suppression seem to be largely indirect. Firstly, there is the somewhat shaky link between 
imitation and fMRI recordings of blood oxygenation in MNS areas combined with the sparsely 
tested assumption that mu is reflective of MNS activity (Arnstein et al., 2011; Braadbaart et al., 
2013). Secondly there is an indirect link between imitation and mu suppression that stems from 
the finding that imitation impairments in individuals with autism spectrum disorders have been 
linked to their mu suppression in response to an action observation task (Bernier et al., 2007). 
Thus, despite often being presented as a cornerstone function of the MNS system (e.g. Iacoboni 
et al., 2005; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), no EEG evidence has been gathered to support 
this assertion.  
Furthermore, nearly all studies of MNS activity during imitation (regardless of 
methodology) use an observation task as a control for their imitation task, introducing a clear 
confound of motor activity between conditions We would expect elevated MNS activity 
during an imitation task compared to passive observation simply because motor activity has 
been added. Although action-observation is also associated with MNS engagement, that effect 
exists during both imitation and observation. A more appropriate control is a non-imitative 
execution of the motor movement, such as that used by Horan and colleagues (2014), Iacoboni 
and colleagues (1999), or Mukamel and colleagues (2010) during their intracranial observations 
(see Chapter 1 on page 6). However, this alternative approach itself is not without its 
drawbacks. If we accept that MNS activity is associated with action-observation, we now have 
one condition with observation (non-imitative execution) and one without (imitation). 
Therefore it may be prudent to include both an action-observation condition and a non-
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imitative execution condition, such that the effect of both can be subtracted out. This method 
of investigating MNS activity during imitation would go some way to addressing the shortfalls 
present in some of the current literature. 
In sum, despite the widely held opinion that imitation should employ the MNS, the 
fMRI literature has been inconsistent. In particular, MNS activation during imitation of facial 
expressions, a task presumably rich in social processing, has not been categorically established. 
As far as the authors of this study are aware, there have been no studies using EEG to investigate 
MNS activity during a facial imitation task. This is perhaps understandable, given the potential 
for facial muscle activity to obliterate the EEG signal, but recordings extracted from before 
movement-associated artefacts are introduced may be analysable.  
The present experiment extended the paradigm of Experiment 2 in several ways to 
increase ecological validity. Firstly, instead of facial expressions presented as still images, 
participants were presented with video of actors performing facial expressions. We rarely 
encounter static facial expressions, so the presentation of video stimuli were intended to make 
the task more naturalistic. Secondly, instead of identifying the expression via a button press, 
participants responded by imitating the facial expression. This more implicit task fits better with 
how people respond in social situations outside the laboratory. Lastly, instead of being asked to 
passively observe as a control task, participants were asked to identify a superficial aspect of the 
stimulus in order to mitigate the possibility that passive observation resulted in less attention to 
the stimulus.  
Participants watched video of an actor performing a facial expression, and were asked 
either to imitate the actor, or to identify the actor’s gender. As a control a similar task was 
administered with emotion words: participants were asked either to produce the associated 
facial expression, or to choose whether the word was short or long.  
It was hypothesised that significant mu suppression would be observed when the 
participant responded by producing a facial response compared to identification of a 
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perfunctory trait, regardless of how the expression was prompted, due to elevated MNS activity 
associated with facial movement. It was further hypothesised that this mu suppression would 
be more powerful when participants were imitating an actor compared to when they were 
producing the facial expression in response to a word, as such a task would be more likely to 
engage the MNS. Regarding frontal theta as a reflection of default-mode network (DMN) 
activity, results from previous experiments were judged not to justify the formulation of 
directional hypotheses for this experiment. Accordingly, a more exploratory strategy was 
adopted, with the hypothesis that frontal theta activity would differ across conditions, without 
specifying the nature of that effect. 
Method 
Participants. 
The same 20 participants were used in all experiments in this thesis. In the analysis of 
Experiment 3 one participant’s data were flagged as erroneous by the trigger correction 
algorithm and, on inspection, one participant did not make any response during the 
identification trials. A third participant did not offer any artefact-free epochs in the imitate-
word condition. These datasets were excluded, for a total of 17 participants’ usable datasets. 
Participants were 12 females and 5 males, ranging from 18-25 years old (m=21.35). Further 
participant details are included the method section of Experiment 1 (page 22). 
Materials. 
Experiment 3 used the shared materials outlined in the method section of Experiment 
1 (see page 23), and video clips from the Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expression Set (ADFES) 
outlined in the materials section of Experiment 2 (see page 52). Instead of the still images used 
in Experiment 2, the present experiment used the ADFES’ video stimuli (excluding the extra 
and high dynamic clips), presented at a size of 720×576 pixels. The video stimuli consisted of 
the same 22 actors and 10 facial expressions: anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise, 
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contempt, pride, and embarrassment, plus neutral. In all clips the actor held a neutral expression 
for 0.5 seconds before onset of the actual expression, which was then held at apex for the rest 
of the 6-second clip. Names of the 10 expressions contained in the ADFES were used during 
control trials. 
Procedure. 
Experiment 3 was presented as a choice reaction time task with one difference: on some 
trials the participant would be asked to respond with a facial expression. Participants viewed 
video of facial expressions from the ADFES, and were asked either to imitate the facial 
expression, or to identify the gender of the actor. As a control task participants were asked to 
perform a similar task with emotion words, either producing the facial expression associated 
with the displayed word, or to identify the word as ‘short’ or ‘long’. The two manipulations 
were task type and stimulus medium, and each had two levels (task type: imitate, identify; 
stimulus medium: word, video). The combination of these manipulations resulted in four 
separate conditions: imitate-word, imitate-video, identify-word, and identify-video. The 
procedure is illustrated in Figure 33. 
For each trial the participant was first presented with either a cue to imitate or two 
options near the bottom of the screen for identification trials (the prompt period). After 4 
seconds the stimulus appeared in the centre of the screen and remained for 7 seconds (the 
stimulus presentation period). The last frame of each video clip was held on screen to fill the 
stimulus presentation period. During the matching trials the participant responded using the 
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response box (described on page 25). The participant’s response was highlighted orange, and 
could not be changed. 
Trials were presented in random order in 15 four-trial blocks with an 11 second fixation 
period between each block. Adjacent trials (i.e. not fixation periods) were separated by a 
fixation period of random duration (mean=3s, SD=0.75s). Eight practice trials (two of each 
condition) were presented at the start of the experiment with instructions. 
Analysis. 
The recording of participants’ EEG data during Experiment 3 was complicated by the 
facial response task. Significant facial electromyography (EMG) can almost completely 
obliterate EEG. In the present experiment it was found that some expressions introduced more 
noise to scalp sensors than others. For instance, surprise tended to result in little EEG 
interference, but anger almost completely masked the EEG signal. Trials where the target 
emotion was ‘neutral’ were not analysed. 
The noise from facial EMG was judged to be a surmountable problem, as the EEG 
from between stimulus presentation and the onset of significant EMG is one section of 
particular interest. Data from facial EMG electrodes (on the left brow and right cheek, see page 
26 for details) were analysed to detect the onset of a facial expression. Kurtosis analysis was 
performed on the gradient at each point combined with all previous points in the epoch, and 
the point of maximum kurtosis was flagged. The closest previous point of zero gradient was 
marked as the EMG onset. This method was not perfect, and trials were excluded where there 
was no clear EMG onset, or where the onset was marked in the wrong place. The EEG data 
were then inspected and epochs were eliminated if there was significant EMG noise in the 
signal before the onset mark.  
Control data were gathered from the fixation periods at the beginning of each block by 
epoching the 500ms beginning at 1500ms, 3500ms, 5500ms, and 7500ms. Control epochs with 
inordinate noise were eliminated. 
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Results 
Behavioural measures. 
The behavioural data from Experiment 3 were analysed, but the ability to draw 
inferences between conditions is limited as the task varied. The onset of the emotion during 
the video clips was 500ms, whereas the emotion word was visible immediately. Across all 
participants EMG onset was detected on average 1596ms after stimulus presentation during 
video trials, and after 853ms during word trials. The requested response varied according to 
trial task, and facial EMG response cannot reasonably be compared to a button press. During 
identification trials reaction time did not differ across stimulus medium.  
Comparing the accuracy of participants’ responses to the identification task between 
video and word trials was complicated as there was no objective threshold for what constitutes 
a ‘long’ word. As such, each participant was likely to have formed their own subjective 
threshold. Accuracy was high (91%) for the gender identification task presented during video 
trials. 
Electrophysiological measures.  
Spectral analysis.  
Using the same technique as Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, mean log central alpha 
power (7.5-12.5Hz) recorded at C3 and C4 (left and right hemisphere motor areas, 
respectively) was calculated for each participant for each of the four 2-second epochs, along 
with mean log theta power (4-7Hz) recorded at Fz (frontal vertex). Comparisons between 
conditions were made using paired t-tests. 
Central alpha.  
During video trials significantly less central alpha (7.5-12Hz) was recorded at C4 
compared to word trials at the same site (p<0.01). This difference between video and word 
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trials approached significance at C3 (p<0.10). Significantly less central alpha was recorded from 
both C3 (p<0.05) and C4 (p<0.01) during identification trials compared to imitation trials. 
As shown in Figure 34, central alpha power during video-imitation trials did not 
significantly differ from word-imitation trials at either C3 or C4. During video-identification 
trials central alpha power was lower than during video-imitation trials compared to word-
imitation trials at both sites (both p<0.05). 
During video trials significantly less central alpha was recorded at both C3 and C4 
during identification trials compared to imitation trials (both p<0.05). During word trials 
significantly less central alpha was recorded during identification trials compared to imitation 
trials at C4 (p<0.05), but not C3 (p≈0.10). 
 
Figure 34. Mean log central alpha (7.5-12Hz) power measured at C3 and C4 during the 500ms before response 
as a function of stimulus medium and task type. The significant difference between identification and imitation 
trials at both sites is not indicated. *p<0.05 
Frontal theta. 
As shown in Figure 35, there were no significant differences in frontal theta between 
any conditions. There does appear to be a hint of an interaction between task type and stimulus 
medium, and the difference between identification and imitation trials with the video stimulus 
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approached significance (p<0.07). Although a one-tailed t-test would have found a significant 
difference (i.e. p<0.04), this was not thought justified given the results for theta in the previous 
experiments were not in the direction expected. 
 
Figure 35. Mean log theta (4-7Hz) power measured at Fz during the 500ms before response as a function of 
stimulus medium and task type. There were no significant differences between conditions. Standard error of the 
means are indicated with error bars. 
Source analysis was performed using eLORETA to localise theta generators. Trials in 
the imitate-video condition were compared to trials from the imitate-word and identify-video 
conditions, and no significant theta difference was found to originate in frontal regions. 
Source localisation. 
One striking result from Experiment 3 is that there was a significant effect of stimulus 
medium on central alpha power during identification trials, but not during imitation trials. This 
effect was further investigated using eLORETA source localisation.  
First, the difference in central alpha generators between imitation and identification 
trials was calculated separately for the video and word trials. As shown in Figure 36, more alpha 
was generated in posterior regions during both video-imitation and word-imitation conditions 
compared to the respective identification conditions. When expanded to general alpha (8-
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15Hz) this difference in posterior alpha was statistically significant during both video and word 
trials (both p<0.01). 
 
Figure 36. Differences in eLORETA source localisations of central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) generators from the 500ms 
pre-response epoch between imitation and identification trials (contrast: (a) video-identify minus video-imitate; 
(b) word-identify minus word-imitate). Areas in which the difference was statistically significant are indicated with 
a shadow underlaid on the background. 
 There were also areas of significantly higher central alpha generation during imitation 
trials compared to identification trials, mainly in lateral areas extending from the inferior parietal 
lobule forward bilaterally. This difference was statistically significant in a small area of the right 
postcentral gyrus during video trials (p<0.05; see Figure 36a), but the difference did not reach 
significance during word trials (p≈0.27; see Figure 37b).  
The difference between the two panels in Figure 36 is shown in Figure 37. The main 
areas of difference were focused on the parahippocampal gyrus of the left limbic lobe (BA15), 
INVESTIGATING SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND REASONING 83 
and the left postcentral gyrus (BA1). This difference was not statistically significant. No 
difference in posterior alpha was found between video and word conditions. 
 
Figure 37. Difference in central alpha (7.5-12.5Hz) generators from the 500ms pre-response epoch between 
imitation and identification trials ([video-identify minus video-imitate] minus [word-identify minus-word 
imitate]).  
Although higher central alpha during imitation trials was not universal, some 
participants exhibited distinctive central alpha patterns that were absent during identification 
trials. Some examples of central alpha patterns found using independent components analysis 
are shown in Figure 38. The patterns of central alpha activity illustrated are characteristic of 
mu, and the rhythm is clearly more pronounced during the imitation trials, which are arranged 
at the bottom of the second image of each panel.  
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Figure 38. Central alpha components from several participants. The first image of each panel is a map of the 
activation pattern of electrodes associated with the independent component. Red indicates that the underlying 
electrodes were positively associated with component activity, and blue indicates that they were negatively 
associated. The second image is a two-dimensional image of component activity over time for all trials. Red 
indicates positive voltage, blue indicates negative voltage. The image is arranged with imitation trials at the bottom 
and identification trials at the top (divided by a black line). The final image of each panel illustrates the 
component’s average power at each frequency between 3 and 40Hz. 
To check that mu was actually suppressed during both conditions, the profile of log mu 
power averaged across all participants in the imitate-video and identify-video conditions was 
assessed as a function of trial number, and compared to mean mu power recorded during inter-
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block control fixation periods. As shown in Figure 39 and Figure 40‡, there was higher central 
alpha recorded at both C3 and C4 during control periods compared to the experimental 
conditions. Although this mu suppression was noisy, it seemed stable over all epochs. The best-
fit lines are reasonably parallel, and there are few trials at either electrode site in which mean 
central alpha during imitation trials was lower than during identification trials. 
 
Figure 39. Mean log central alpha power (7.5-12.5Hz) recorded at C3 during Experiment 3 as a function of trial 
number, separated by task type (i.e. imitate, identify) along with mean log central alpha power during the epochs 
from the intervening fixation periods. Data are averaged across participants. Dotted lines are lines of best-fit.  
                                            
‡ Note that the data displayed in Figure 39 and Figure 40 were generated during a separate analysis 
performed to confirm the results of the first analysis. No marked difference in the overall pattern between the first 
and second analyses was found, but the exact values varied presumably due to slight differences in epoch rejection. 
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Figure 40.  Mean log central alpha power (7.5-12.5Hz) recorded at C4 during Experiment 3 as a function of trial 
number, separated by task type (i.e. imitate, identify) along with mean log central alpha power during the epochs 
from the intervening fixation periods. Data are averaged across participants. Dotted lines are lines of best-fit.  
Discussion 
Less mu suppression was recorded from participants in the 500ms prior to their imitating 
a facial expression compared to when they judged a superficial aspect of the stimulus. This 
difference in mu suppression was stronger during video trials in comparison to word trials. 
When the mu suppression associated with observing the stimulus was subtracted, the net result 
was slight mu facilitation associated with facial imitation. This was illustrated during 
independent components analysis (ICA), with some participants showing clear mu components 
during imitation trials that were absent during identification trials.  
During identification trials there was significant pre-response mu suppression during 
video trials compared to word trials. This is generally consistent with the literature (Dapretto 
et al., 2005; Ferrari et al., 2012), which has indicated that facial processing involves some MNS 
activity. Mu suppression during observation of facial expressions was also found in Experiment 
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2 of the present thesis. Experiment 3 has demonstrated that this is the case even during a 
superficial gender-identification task, when the participant’s attention is being directed away 
from processing the emotional content of the expression. 
Significantly higher posterior alpha was recorded during identification trials compared 
to imitation trials. This posterior alpha difference did not vary across stimulus medium, 
illustrated by its absence in the subtraction of differences shown in Figure 37. 
The results failed to support the first hypothesis that more mu suppression would occur 
during imitation trials compared to identification trials. Rather, findings revealed a significant 
difference in mu suppression in the opposite direction. The second hypothesis that mu 
suppression would be greater in response to video stimuli was also effectively unsupported. 
Although mu suppression was greater in the video condition, the mu suppression was in the 
opposite direction to that hypothesised. 
These results are difficult to reconcile with mirror neuron system (MNS) theory. It was 
expected that participants would exhibit mu suppression just prior to the detection of facial 
movement regardless of whether it was in response to a face or a word. This mu suppression 
would be associated with the action of producing a facial expression, remembering that mirror 
neurons are activated by motor movements in isolation. It could be that more mu suppression 
is generated by finger movements compared to facial movements, resulting in more mu 
suppression during the identification task compared to the imitation task. However, if the MNS 
was involved in social processing of facial expressions and imitation, we would expect extra 
mu suppression to be found during trials where participants imitated a face compared to when 
they simply produced a facial expression. Such a difference was not found. 
This lack of difference in mu suppression between facial imitation and prompted 
production is not consistent with the fMRI literature. These studies have generally found that 
MNS activity is significantly associated with imitation in general (Iacoboni et al., 1999, 2005; 
Molenberghs et al., 2009), and imitation of facial expressions in particular (Dapretto et al., 
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2005; Lee et al., 2006; van der Gaag et al., 2007). The results of the present experiment are, 
however, consistent with those of Horan and colleagues (2014), who found no significant 
differences in MNS activation between imitation and prompted execution. The results of the 
present experiment, although unexpected, are not particularly anomalous given the 
inconsistency of the findings of previous studies. 
Moreover, most of these studies have used a control condition either with no motor 
component, or with no action-observation component. The advantage of the present 
experiment is that it had both, in addition to a condition in which participants observed the 
prompt, allowing both factors to be subtracted. The stark difference between the results from 
the present experiment and the accepted MNS canon is indicative of problems with either the 
current MNS model of facial imitation, or mu suppression as an indicator of MNS activity.  
The significantly stronger posterior alpha detected during identification trials compared 
to imitation trials is likely to be a result of confounding task differences between the conditions. 
The identification task was likely significantly easier than the imitation task (although no 
accuracy data were collected), and the posterior alpha during the identification trials is likely to 
reflect lower demands on visual attention The identification task was, after all, designed to 
require only superficial processing of the stimulus, whereas the imitation condition was 
designed to require deeper processing. The difference in posterior alpha between imitation and 
identification trials was essentially equal regardless of stimulus medium. This, combined with 
the identical reaction times for the gender and word length identification tasks indicate that 
these control tasks were well matched, despite the difference in stimulus.Theta at Fz was also 
compared between conditions. An interaction approached significance wherein theta at Fz was 
lower during the imitation trials compared to identification trials only in response to video 
stimuli. Source localisation indicated that this activity did not originate from frontal areas. These 
results did not support the hypothesis that frontal theta would differ between conditions. 
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The lack of significant differences in frontal theta on the basis of stimulus medium or 
task type is difficult to interpret. The results could indicate that frontal theta activity is not a 
reliable indicator of default-mode network (DMN) activity. Alternatively, it is possible that the 
present manipulations were not sensitive enough to elicit differences in theta activity. It has 
been suggested that the DMN is not particularly involved in shallow social processing tasks 
such as emotion recognition (Knyazev et al., 2011; Mars et al., 2012). Under this model the 
DMN more active during social reasoning that requires more conscious thought, such as the 
task from Experiment 1 of this thesis.  
The unique methodology of this experiment may have affected the validity of the 
results. Recording EEG and facial response simultaneously is problematic as the electrical 
activity from muscle activity can add significant noise to the EEG signal. Epoching EEG to the 
point just before the onset of significant EMG as measured by facial electrodes should have 
allowed the analysis of activity associated with the decision of which expression to produce. 
This approach does not, however, eliminate the possibility that facial movements could occur 
before social processing is complete, perhaps in preparation for the yet to be decided facial 
action. If this were the case one might expect that MNS engagement had not yet reached its 
peak, resulting in less mu suppression being analysed than actually occurred prior to the facial 
expression. This possibility could perhaps be mitigated in the future by combining EMG with 
video recordings of participants’ faces to investigate the timeline of facial expression generation.  
In this experiment the effects of facial muscle activity on EEG could not be completely 
eliminated. On inspection of the data it was noted that on some trials noise was certainly 
introduced in the fraction of a second before EMG onset was detected, and that was only the 
noise apparent during visual inspection. It seems plausible that more subtle characteristics of 
the EMG signal could also be imposed on the EEG. EMG noise would, however, tend to 
increase spectral power across all frequencies, whereas mu power was lower during imitation 
trials than it was during control fixation in the present experiment. Furthermore, despite these 
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limitations the source of the lower-alpha difference between imitation and identification during 
video trials was localised to the postcentral gyrus. This neurally plausible localisation strongly 
indicates that there was a real difference in mu generation, as opposed to general noise from 
EMG. There is a chance that the hand movements associated with pressing a button to respond 
to the identification trials caused more mu suppression than the facial movements required to 
perform the imitation task. This is plausible, but does not explain the absence of a significant 
difference in mu suppression between the imitation of facial expressions, and the production 
of said facial expressions from a textual cue. 
Overall the present experiment found evidence against a mirror neuron account of 
facial expression imitation. Mu suppression was just as great when participants imitated a video 
clip of a facial expression as when they performed it following a textual prompt. Furthermore, 
there was less mu suppression in the lead up to producing these facial expressions than there 
was when participants used a button press to identify a perfunctory property of the word or 
video.  
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
The series of experiments presented in this thesis investigated activity of the purported 
mirror neuron system (MNS) and default-mode network (DMN) using 
electroencephalography (EEG). Suppression of mu activity has become an important proxy 
measure of activity in the MNS, and was used to examine MNS engagement. The literature 
was less clear on what EEG correlates would be expected of DMN activity. Frontal theta 
suppression has been proposed as such a correlate (Scheeringa et al., 2008), the validity of which 
was explored during social reasoning tasks. It was hypothesised that both mu suppression and 
frontal theta suppression would be detected during social reasoning tasks. 
The Mirror Neuron System 
Summary. 
In Experiment 1 participants were presented with social reasoning and physics problems 
in both video and text form. It was hypothesised that mu suppression and frontal theta 
suppression would be associated with social reasoning. These hypotheses were partially 
supported: participants were found to exhibit mu suppression during social reasoning problems 
relative to physics problems regardless of stimulus medium, but there was no evidence of frontal 
theta suppression. 
Experiment 2 investigated the hypothesis that mu suppression and frontal theta 
suppression would be associated with more instantaneous, perceptual social processing. 
Participants were presented with an emotion recognition task during which participants 
responded with a button press. The hypotheses were again partially supported. Right 
hemisphere mu suppression was found to be selectively associated with the process of explicitly 
identifying an emotion, but no difference in frontal theta suppression was detected. 
Experiment 3 compared mu suppression during imitation of a facial expression 
presented in a video to production of a facial expression in response to a textual cue. It was 
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hypothesised that mu suppression and frontal theta suppression would be associated with 
imitation more than prompted production. Neither hypothesis was supported. During the 
500ms immediately prior to response more mu suppression was found during prompted 
production of the facial expression compared to imitation, and no task-related differences in 
frontal theta suppression were detected. 
Notwithstanding for the moment any contentiousness of mu as an EEG analogue of 
MNS activity, this thesis garnered some support for an MNS model of social cognition. Robust 
mu suppression differences in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 was predicted by MNS theory. 
In Experiment 1 extensive MNS activation was found during a social reasoning task, a result 
that could have gone either way according to the established MNS canon. It has been suggested 
that the MNS might be mainly involved in automatic social perception, as opposed to conscious 
social deliberation (Pineda & Hecht, 2009). One might account for MNS activity during the 
video tasks as due to participants perceiving facial expressions and behavioural cues from the 
actors. However, a purely perceptual account of MNS function cannot explain its activation 
during social reasoning problems presented as text. Furthermore, significant MNS activity was 
detected during the question period of both conditions, in which only the textual question and 
response options were presented. This MNS activity was stronger in the text condition, further 
demonstrating that the MNS can be engaged by more deliberative social cognition. 
Given that we might not expect to detect MNS activation during the deliberative 
processing of the task in Experiment 1, the analysis of Experiment 2 used the same techniques 
to investigate the mu rhythm during a task more traditionally thought to engage the MNS. 
During Experiment 2 participants were asked to identify the emotion portrayed by the facial 
expression of an actor with a button press. Although the task was not particularly naturalistic, 
it succeeded in eliciting comprehensive MNS activity. The mu suppression associated with 
identifying the emotion expressed on a face remained significant in the right hemisphere even 
after subtracting the effect of passively observing the face, and selecting an option.  
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The results of Experiment 2 showed that the techniques used in this thesis were well-
suited for detecting mu suppression, and supported the assertion that the social reasoning task 
from Experiment 1 elicited MNS activity. Additionally, mu suppression identified during both 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 was stronger in the right hemisphere, further indicating that 
the two experiments detected the same underlying construct. 
After the successful identification of MNS activity in the social processing tasks of 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, it was predicted that the more naturalistic task of Experiment 
3 would also elicit MNS activity. The task was similar to Experiment 2, with the main 
difference being that participants imitated the presented facial expression, instead of identifying 
it with a button press. It was found that imitation of a facial expression did not result in 
significantly more mu suppression than producing the expression in response to a textual 
prompt. In fact, more mu suppression was detected during the control task. Although the 
control task did demand a motor response, the task itself did not require any processing that 
we might regard as requiring extensive MNS activity, and certainly not more than emotion 
imitation. Furthermore, the effect of the button press was subtracted during source analyses, 
and the difference in mu suppression remained. These results indicate that the production of 
facial expressions, whether due to imitation or verbal prompt, does not require engagement of 
the MNS. To the contrary, there appeared to be some mu facilitation associated with facial 
expression imitation. 
Although Experiment 3 contained some methodological limitations associated with 
facial muscle activity, these should not have differed between imitation and prompted 
execution. Although some may attribute the higher mu power found during facial response 
trials to noise from facial muscle activity, this view is discounted by the localisation of the 
difference to the left postcentral gyri. It is unlikely that noise of a non-neural origin would be 
localised in such a biologically plausible fashion. Furthermore, some participants exhibited 
distinctive mu activity during facial response trials that was absent during button press trials. 
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Despite the novel techniques employed in Experiment 3, we can be reasonably certain that the 
differences in mu suppression found between conditions were accurate reflections of underlying 
brain activity.  
Synthesis. 
Significant differences in mu activity were detected in all experiments, although not in 
the direction hypothesised during Experiment 3. The source of mu activity has not been 
investigated particularly often, especially not using eLORETA, so these localisations are of 
some interest in themselves. The largest differences in mu generation between conditions were 
almost always localised to either the precentral gyrus, the postcentral gyrus, or the inferior 
parietal lobule, all areas associated with the purported MNS (Hamilton et al., 2007). The mu 
differences originating from these regions were always of greater magnitude than that found in 
the other MNS area: the inferior frontal gyrus (BA44). These results indicate that the central 
and posterior regions of the human MNS generate mu. 
There were some subtle differences in localisation between experiments. While viewing 
the social reasoning video clips during Experiment 1 mu suppression was localised to the 
precentral gyrus, whereas during the question period the source of mu suppression was more 
posterior, strongest in the postcentral gyrus. During Experiment 2 the focus of mu suppression 
during emotion recognition was more posterior again, with its focus in the inferior parietal 
lobule and postcentral gyrus. However, during observation of faces compared to words the 
focus of mu suppression was localised to the postcentral gyrus. Mu facilitation during 
Experiment 3 was also localised to the postcentral gyrus. Despite the slight differences between 
experiments, inferring some sort of task-related effect on the source of mu would probably be 
premature. As discussed in the next section, eLORETA images should not be interpreted in 
isolation from their composition. In addition to the inherently poor spatial resolution of EEG, 
the smoothing heuristic used in eLORETA could cause slight differences in localisation, 
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especially when the number and magnitude of sources varies. As such, the most likely source 
of mu suppression is the lateral postcentral gyri. 
Some lateralisation of mu suppression was observed. In the first two experiments mu 
suppression associated with social processing was lateralised to the right hemisphere, whereas 
the mu facilitation associated with imitation of facial expressions during Experiment 3 was 
lateralised to the left hemisphere. It is the right hemisphere that is more often associated with 
MNS-associated mu suppression (Leslie et al., 2004), and general emotion processing 
(Campbell, 1982).  
Assessment of techniques. 
The results presented in this thesis indicate that the novel analysis techniques utilised 
were eminently appropriate for detecting mu suppression. In addition to traditional 
comparisons of lower frequency alpha activity measured at the C3 and C4 electrode sites 
(located over the right and left hemisphere sensorimotor areas respectively), Exact Low 
Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography (eLORETA) was used to localise sources of mu. 
Labelling activity as mu implies both a frequency range (7.5-12.5Hz, give or take depending 
on the paper you are reading), and a source (the sensorimotor areas). Although many source 
localisation techniques exist, eLORETA is perhaps the most modern, and its employment here 
represents a vast improvement over simple electrode-wise comparisons.  
Some researchers may be worried about the reduced statistical power of using 
eLORETA compared to electrode-wise comparisons. This is a valid concern, multiple 
comparisons are much less of an issue when comparing activity at two electrodes compared to 
the 6239 voxels of an eLORETA image. Fortunately the eLORETA software package does 
not implement a Bonferroni correction; Statistical Non-Parametric Modelling (SnPM), 
inherently corrects for multiple comparisons. Although there is some loss of statistical power 
from correction for multiple comparisons, the decrease is not all that drastic, and there is much 
to be gained from a whole-brain analysis. 
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Let us consider some examples from this thesis. First we will look at the differences in 
mu power during imitation trials compared to identification trials during Experiment 3 (see the 
right panel of Figure 34 on page 80). Significantly less mu activity was found during 
identification trials compared to imitation trials for both video and word trials independently, 
but no statistically reliable difference in right hemisphere mu was found by eLORETA 
comparisons (see Figure 36 on page 82). This may be viewed as a weakness of eLORETA 
comparisons, but in reality the source localisation only contains extra information. Unless we 
cast aside all previous research on mu suppression as invalid, the results of this experiment still 
indicated a significant difference in mu between the two conditions. We can use eLORETA 
to augment the analysis by allowing us to infer the most likely source of the difference in 
electrode-wise power. In the case of the comparison of interest, that is likely to have been the 
right postcentral gyrus. 
To illustrate a situation where eLORETA clearly demonstrated its usefulness, consider 
the comparison between the social reasoning and physics problems during the video trials of 
Experiment 1 (see Figure 7 on page 36). Using the traditional electrode-wise comparison it 
appeared that there was significant mu suppression during the presentation of the physics video 
compared to the social reasoning video, a result that would be considered highly anomalous 
under established MNS theory. However the eLORETA source localisation revealed that this 
apparent difference in mu was entirely due to a stronger posterior alpha rhythm during the 
social reasoning trials (see Figure 17 on page 43). Furthermore, eLORETA revealed distinct 
areas of significant mu suppression in the precentral and postcentral gyri. This example clearly 
illustrates the utility of using eLORETA in parallel with electrode-wise comparisons to mitigate 
the confounding effect of alpha activity from outside the sensorimotor areas. 
It is clear that eLORETA comparisons are superior to electrode-wise comparisons in 
determining the source of mu activity, but they also hold another, more subtle, advantage. The 
whole-brain analysis used in eLORETA comparisons can also provide evidence that differences 
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in mu-range activity do not occur outside of sensorimotor areas. This is well-demonstrated in 
the eLORETA analysis of Experiment 2 (see Figure 29 on page 63) which demonstrated 
significant mu suppression during emotion recognition exclusive to the inferior parietal lobule 
and adjacent sensorimotor regions. Statistical comparisons using SnPM can be restricted to 
regions of interest to increase statistical power. The increase in power is not directly 
proportional to the proportion of the brain being analysed, but the mechanism of this statistical 
power increase is reasonably intuitive (refer to the synopsis of SnPM on page 32). In analysing 
a smaller volume of the brain where the voxel-wise differences will hypothetically be more 
reliable, the number of random labelling schemes with significant differences caused by factors 
unrelated to the experimental task is presumably reduced. This increases the relative magnitude 
of the comparison using the actual labels from the experiment, thereby increasing significance. 
Such a restricted comparison is not possible in the current version of the eLORETA software 
package, the images must be exported to an fMRI package. 
It should be noted that eLORETA is not without its weaknesses. Regardless of the 
appearance of the images, the data are still from 32-electrode EEG recordings, and the 
limitations of EEG still apply. Deep sources are problematic for EEG, and any subcortical 
sources found by eLORETA should be viewed with that in mind. This is not so much of an 
issue when looking at cortical sources, as was done in this thesis. Another limitation of the 
application of eLORETA here was that electrode locations were not rendered. Individuals vary 
in terms of scalp sizes and topographies, and more precise knowledge of where each electrode 
was allows the more precise location of sources. The analyses in this thesis used standard 
electrode locations, which would tend to make sources less distinct due to the standard locations 
differing (presumably randomly) from the actual electrode locations with which the EEG was 
recorded. Another potential improvement would be the addition of more electrodes. The 
utilisation of a 64- or 128-channel cap would allow the more precise discrimination of sources, 
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although with more overhead in terms of setup time (or noise if impedance thresholds are 
raised), and cost of equipment. 
Another potential limitation of the techniques utilised in this thesis was the wide 
frequency range (7.5-12.5Hz) used to assess mu. The mu frequency generally averages about 
10Hz, and some studies have used a tighter 9-11Hz window (e.g. Defebvre et al., 1998). 
However, as mentioned earlier in this thesis the frequency window used to assess mu varies 
somewhat between studies. A 5Hz window such as the one used in the present thesis is perhaps 
the most typical (Oberman et al., 2008), and it can account for a wide range of individual 
differences. The window in the current study was offset somewhat from the more typical 8-
13Hz in order to centre around 10Hz. The wide frequency range used in this thesis could have 
allowed some noise into the mu measurements. A solution to this could be to define the mu 
frequency on a per-subject basis, and then perform spectral analyses on a smaller frequency 
window centred on the participant’s individual mu frequency. This method would also 
eliminate the problem of potentially missing a participant’s mu activity due to a small frequency 
window. 
A departure from previous studies in this thesis was that here mu activity was compared 
directly between conditions. The method de rigueur in previous studies has been to 
operationalise mu suppression as the difference in mu power between experimental conditions 
and a baseline (usually fixation; e.g. Oberman et al., 2005). Mu suppression is then compared 
between conditions. This thesis forwent this subtraction from a constant, and compared mu 
power directly between conditions. 
Mu power tended to decrease over the course of the experiments. It was highest in 
Experiment 1, and lowest during Experiment 3. If the standard procedure was used of 
comparing each participant’s mu power during experimental conditions to baseline, this 
difference in absolute power would not have been apparent. The reduction in mu power 
indicates that some task-related effects may have carried over between experiments. The 
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complete randomisation of trials used in each experiment should in theory have precluded this 
overall trend from impacting the comparisons in individual experiments, but the causes of this 
trend could possibly be investigated by randomising experiment order in future studies. The 
long-range temporal dynamics of mu suppression found during this experiment may have 
implications for studies that have not used a randomised design (Braadbaart et al., 2013; van 
der Gaag et al., 2007). 
The methods utilised in this thesis for detecting mu suppression offer a number of 
benefits over traditional techniques. The utility of using whole-brain analyses performed on 
eLORETA source localisations in addition to the traditional comparisons of electrode-wise 
power was clearly demonstrated. Perhaps one of the most significant barriers to the more 
widespread adoption of the eLORETA software package is its poor documentation. Some 
functions, especially those more recently added, are not documented at all. Although the 
eLORETA package has a more user-friendly design than other analysis packages, the paucity 
of its documentation hinders its chances of broader adoption. 
Implications for mirror neurons and mu.  
Both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 detected mu suppression during social processing 
tasks, whereas Experiment 3 did not. These results have some important implications for MNS 
theory. Starting with Experiment 1, mu suppression was detected during deliberative social 
reasoning. We may not necessarily have expected this result. Under Pineda and Hecht’s (2009) 
componential model, the MNS is engaged during automatic social perception, whereas another 
system is responsible for more deliberative social processing tasks. This model will be briefly 
discussed towards the end of this chapter in conjunction with default-mode network (DMN) 
results. 
The results from Experiment 2 are more concordant with the established model of the 
human MNS. Mu suppression was detected during recognition of facial expressions, a 
perceptual task that we might well expect to engage the MNS. The mu suppression associated 
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with facial expression recognition was lateralised to the right hemisphere, embodying the 
stereotypical pattern of mu suppression. 
Experiment 3 found results contrary to some of the core assumptions of MNS theory. 
Despite the dearth of direct evidence for a human MNS, the action-observation congruence 
of neurons in the macaque brain has been extrapolated to be the seat of human social cognition 
(Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), and the basis for some 
disorders of social functioning (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Ramachandran & Oberman, 2007; 
Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & Perrett, 2001). Mu suppression has been extrapolated as the 
EEG proxy of MNS function on account of its similar activity profile to that of the inferred 
human MNS. Now that researchers are going back and checking the array of assumptions in 
that chain of reasoning, it does not appear as bullet-proof as has been presented in some 
research. 
Imitation is a higher order social function thought to be essentially unique to higher-
order primates (Whiten, 2011). As such it has largely been assumed that imitation must be a 
function of the MNS, our highly evolved social processing system (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004; Williams et al., 2001). As outlined in Experiment 3 (on page 136), this is not a well-
tested proposition at all. Most fMRI studies investigating MNS activity during imitation 
compare activity during imitation of a video stimulus to somewhat ill-suited control tasks. This 
control task generally takes one of two forms, each with limitations. The first type of control 
task is passively observing the stimulus, this is limited because we would probably expect extra 
MNS activation during imitation simply because of the extra motor activity. The second (less 
common) control task is executing the action in a non-imitative context. Although an 
improvement in that motor activity does not vary between conditions, it is limited because we 
would expect extra MNS activation during imitation on account of the action-observation 
which is absent during control. Nevertheless, at least one fMRI study has found no significant 
difference in purported MNS areas when comparing an imitation task with non-imitative 
INVESTIGATING SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND REASONING 101 
execution (Horan, Pineda, et al., 2014). In short, studies of imitation contain three factors 
pertaining to the MNS: action, action-observation, and imitation. The goal must be to control 
for the effects of both action and action-observation, leaving only imitation, something which 
has not been done particularly thoroughly in past studies. 
The design used to investigate imitation in Experiment 3 offers significant benefits over 
that used in past studies. Experiment 3 used a 2x2 design containing both of the 
abovementioned controls (an observation task and a non-imitative execution task with a textual 
prompt), in addition to another control wherein the participant observed the textual prompt. 
This effectively allowed the isolation of the imitation effect by subtraction. First the effect of 
the observation of a facial expression was subtracted from the imitation condition. Then the 
effect of the action was found by subtracting activity during the observation of the prompt 
from activity during the prompted execution. This action effect was then subtracted from 
activity during imitation minus observation and we were (theoretically) left with only the effect 
of imitation. In the case of Experiment 3, that effect was slight mu facilitation. 
Another assumption that is often made when studying the MNS using EEG is that mu 
suppression represents MNS activity, and only MNS activity. Mu suppression was originally 
proposed as an analogue of MNS activity because it behaves similarly to what we might expect 
of the MNS (Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004). Recent studies investigating the correlation 
between mu suppression and fMRI activity in MNS areas have been less than conclusive 
(Arnstein et al., 2011; Braadbaart et al., 2013). Like activity in the purported MNS, mu 
suppression can indeed be observed during both action, and action-observation (Rizzolatti, 
Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). It can also be modulated by object-directedness 
(Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004). But even if mu does genuinely reflect MNS activity, it 
need not do so exclusively; other neural systems might also suppress mu. Clearly EEG evidence 
for the human MNS has largely been built on a crucial assumption. This assumption remains 
to be definitively justified, even a decade later. 
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Even without the results of this thesis, it seems increasingly unlikely that mu suppression 
perfectly and selectively captures the activity of a human MNS. Aside from the results from 
fMRI-EEG studies, there is a seemingly continuous stream of studies that have detected mu 
suppression in unintuitive situations. These studies invariably conclude that the MNS must be 
involved in even more situations than we thought. Recently mu suppression has been used to 
implicate the MNS in the social mechanics of cigarette addiction (Pineda & Oberman, 2006), 
contagion of yawning (Cooper et al., 2012), interpretation of Rorschach tests (Pineda, 
Giromini, & Porcelli, 2011), and sexual arousal during the viewing of erotica (Mouras et al., 
2008). There is certainly a chance that the human MNS may be involved in all of these 
functions in a roundabout way. However we must not discount the possibility that the 
suitability of mu suppression as a measure for human MNS has been overestimated, and other 
factors are affecting mu in some studies.  
Although fMRI investigation of MNS activity during imitation has often had 
methodological flaws, investigation using EEG has been non-existent. It seems to have been 
largely assumed that imitation should result in mu suppression (unless a significant file-drawer 
effect exists). This paucity of data is all the stranger given that perhaps the mirror neuron study 
that most captured the attention of the popular media was the establishment of a link between 
mu suppression and imitative deficits in autism spectrum disorders (ASD; Ramachandran & 
Oberman, 2007). Note that some subsequent studies have had trouble replicating this result 
(e.g. Raymaekers et al., 2009). If mu suppression during action-observation is atypically low in 
individuals with an ASD, and the degree of mu abnormality is correlated with their imitative 
deficits, surely we should look to establish a relationship between imitation and mu suppression. 
Experiment 3 of the present thesis investigated the possibility of such a link, and it was 
not found. Instead, there was some facilitation of mu associated with imitation relative to a 
non-imitative control task. This effect cannot be reconciled with the current MNS canon. The 
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data presented in this thesis do not allow us to grapple with issues pertaining to the basic 
existence of a human MNS, but we have a foundation for two theoretical accounts.  
Firstly, perhaps imitation is not associated particularly with MNS activation. This may 
not be particularly palatable, mainly because it seems intuitive that the MNS should be involved 
in imitation, and MNS theory is nothing if not intuitive. MNS theory has a natural appeal in 
that it is a graceful and simple model of a complex phenomenon: the ‘holy grail’ of science 
perhaps. But is it reasonable to expect a simple neural explanation for complex behaviours like 
social cognition? Perhaps not, and mounting evidence is suggesting that the current model of 
the MNS during social cognition needs reconsidering. 
Alternatively (or additionally), mu suppression may not be as close a corollary of MNS 
activity as widely thought. Mu suppression might not always accompany MNS activity, or vice 
versa. Certainly mu suppression was not particularly associated with what is thought to be a 
fundamental function of the MNS in Experiment 3 of the present thesis. This does not 
necessarily imply that mu has nothing to do with action understanding or social processing, it 
may well do. In Experiment 3 more mu suppression was observed when participants produced 
a facial expression from a textual prompt than when they imitated a facial expression. Clearly 
some sort of social reasoning must occur in translating the emotion word to a facial expression. 
This may involve imagining someone performing the associated facial expression, or inducing 
the emotion in oneself. The former process might plausibly involve the MNS, as MNS activity 
has been found during imagination of actions (Pfurtscheller, Brunner, Schlögl, & Lopes da 
Silva, 2006). However it would be difficult to argue that we would expect more MNS activity 
during that process than during imitation. There may be other systems at play during social 
processing, perhaps generating mu suppression, but not relying on action-observation 
congruence as much as MNS theory predicts. 
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The Default-Mode Network 
The experiments in the present thesis were not successful in detecting frontal theta 
suppression as a proposed correlate of default-mode network (DMN) function. Frontal theta 
power was not associated with social reasoning during any of the experiments in the present 
thesis. The hypothesis of frontal theta power differences was driven by two findings. Firstly we 
would expect the DMN to be active during social reasoning as Jack and colleagues (2013) 
found this using fMRI with the same method as Experiment 1. Secondly we would expect 
DMN activity to be negatively correlated with frontal theta on account of the findings of 
Scheeringa and colleagues’ (2008) using simultaneous fMRI-EEG. Clearly the two effects 
combined are not reliable enough to be useful in DMN research using EEG.  
It seems likely that frontal theta suppression is not a reliable correlate of DMN activity, 
given the lack of concordance from other studies (e.g. Chen et al., 2008). If not frontal theta, 
then what reflection of DMN activity might we expect to see using EEG? One candidate that 
has received some support is posterior alpha (Jann et al., 2009; Knyazev et al., 2011). 
Experiment 1 offered some support for this theory, with a strong posterior alpha rhythm 
detected during trials containing a video clip of an interaction between two people. This was 
the same condition found to elicit the most DMN activity in Jack and colleagues’ (2013) study. 
Although that study concluded that DMN activity was associated with social reasoning, the 
posterior alpha activity detected during Experiment 1 was not entirely concordant with that 
account. Posterior alpha was only present during the video, and not the question period 
presented at the end of each trial. It seems unlikely that all social reasoning occurred before the 
question was presented, so we would expect to detect DMN activity during the question 
period. However, when we take into account the difference in methodologies, the lack of 
posterior alpha difference during the question period of Experiment 1 does not necessarily 
disagree with the findings of Jack and colleagues’ (2013). The poorer temporal resolution of 
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fMRI could well cause activity to sustain from the stimulus presentation period to the question 
period. 
Nevertheless, as pointed out in the discussion of Experiment 1 we must be careful when 
ascribing non-resting functions to resting-state networks. DMN activity at its most basic is 
impacted by attention – that is how it was originally defined (Raichle et al., 2001). It is difficult 
to match stimuli with different content on the basis of attention. In Experiment 1 the social 
reasoning and physics video clips were presented the same size, and for the same length of time, 
but that did not preclude attentional differences between the two. For instance, there was far 
more variety in the physics clips, and this novelty may have affected attentional demands. The 
difficulty of associating resting-state activity patterns with other functions is illustrated 
throughout this thesis. In addition to varying across reasoning domain in Experiment 1, 
posterior alpha was also found to differ on the basis of other factors. There were significant 
posterior alpha differences caused by visual attention in Experiment 2 (see Figure 27 on page 
61), and task difficulty in Experiment 3 (see Figure 36 on page 82). Separating attentional 
effects from experimental effects of interest remains one of the less tractable problems when 
investigating potential functions of the DMN. 
If DMN activity does actually reflect attentional demands, there is still the possibility 
that attention was modulated by the experimental manipulation rather than some confounding 
factor. If the human brain does have MNS-like evolutionarily specialised circuitry for social 
cognition (but no such system for physics problems), we might expect that social reasoning will 
normally have lower attentional demands. Under this model the DMN itself is not performing 
social reasoning, rather it is suppressing activity in the more conscious areas of the brain while 
largely automatic social processing is performed. 
Although the present thesis did not detect any DMN-associated theta suppression 
during facial processing in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, it remains unclear as whether that 
should have been expected. Investigations of the functions of fMRI resting-state networks have 
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only commenced relatively recently, and some studies have suggested that the DMN is only 
employed for deliberative social processing (Mars et al., 2012). Under this model we would 
expect DMN activation during the social reasoning task presented in Experiment 1, but not 
during the more perceptual facial processing tasks presented in the other two experiments.  
Implications for Componential Social Cognition 
The componential theory of social cognition holds that there exist two social cognition 
domains (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). Under this model deliberative social reasoning and 
perceptual social reasoning are two distinct neural processes. Pineda and Hecht (2009) extended 
this model by suggesting that the perceptual component of social reasoning is the MNS. The 
results of Experiment 1 did not support this version of the componential model, with significant 
mu suppression detected during deliberative social reasoning in the absence of social stimuli.  
This thesis found some support for the DMN as the basis for deliberative social 
reasoning. Posterior alpha, which may reflect DMN activity (Knyazev et al., 2011), was found 
to be elevated during the social reasoning tasks during Experiment 1, but not during the more 
perceptual tasks of the other experiments. The possibility that this was an attentional artefact 
requires further investigation. 
Concluding remarks 
The present thesis investigated activity in two proposed brain networks during social 
cognition tasks: the default-mode network (DMN) and mirror neuron system (MNS). No 
evidence for frontal theta suppression as a correlate of DMN activity was found, but posterior 
alpha was proposed as a candidate EEG correlate of the DMN. Mu suppression was 
demonstrated during periods of deliberative social reasoning not explained by either action, or 
action-observation. This could indicate that the role of the purported MNS is not limited to 
action and perception, but can extend to general social reasoning. MNS-associated mu 
suppression was not detected during imitation of facial expressions (quite the contrary, in fact), 
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calling into question the established model of the MNS. These results indicate that the current 
model of the human MNS lacks predictive validity. It is suggested that either the MNS is not 
required for imitation beyond the required action and action-observation, or that mu 
suppression is not as strong a correlate of MNS activity as some have assumed.   
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Date of Birth:  ________________________________ 
 
 
Gender:  ________________________________ 
 
 
Highest education:    NCEA Level 1/School Certificate 
 NCEA Level 2/University Entrance 
 NCEA Level 3/Bursary 
 Tertiary Certificate  
 Bachelor’s Degree 
 Postgraduate Degree 
 
 
Please indicate your preferences in the use of hands in the following activities or objects: 
 
 Always right Usually right Both equally Usually left Always left 
Writing      
Throwing      
Toothbrush      




Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental health disorder?  Yes  /  No 
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Has a first-degree relative of yours (i.e. parent, sibling, child) ever been diagnosed with a 
mental health disorder?         
Yes  /  No 
 













If you would like to be contacted in the future, please indicate your preference(s) and provide 
a contact email address below. 
 










Due to the nature of this task, we ask that you do not discuss the experiment with your friends 
or colleagues. 
 
By signing below, you are acknowledging that the information you have provided above is 
accurate to the best of your knowledge, and that you are agreeing to not discuss this 
experiment with others. 
 
 




Name:  ___________________________________ 
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Appendix B: Links to DirectX Diagnostic Tool Output 
Links to output of DxDiag Tool for both computers used in this thesis: 
Stimulus PC: http://pastebin.com/raw.php?i=5Br6fp9h 
Recording PC: http://pastebin.com/raw.php?i=1UxfTLa7 
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Appendix C: BAPQ Items  
1. I like being around other people (R)§ 
2. I find it hard to get my words out smoothly 
3. I am comfortable with unexpected changes in plans (R) 
4. It’s hard for me to avoid getting sidetracked in conversation 
5. I would rather talk to people to get information than to socialize 
6. People have to talk me into trying something new 
7. I am “in-tune” with the other person during conversation (R) 
8. I have to warm myself up to the idea of visiting an unfamiliar place 
9. I enjoy being in social situations (R) 
10. My voice has a flat or monotone sound to it 
11. I feel disconnected or “out of sync” in conversations with others 
12. People find it easy to approach me (R) 
13. I feel a strong need for sameness from day to day 
14. People ask me to repeat things I’ve said because they don’t understand 
15. I am flexible about how things should be done (R) 
16. I look forward to situations where I can meet new people (R) 
17. I have been told that I talk too much about certain topics 
18. When I make conversation it is just to be polite 
19. I look forward to trying new things (R) 
20. I speak too loudly or softly 
21. I can tell when someone is not interested in what I am saying (R) 
22. I have a hard time dealing with changes in my routine 
23. I am good at making small talk (R) 
                                            
§ (R) indicates reverse scored items 
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24. I act very set in my ways 
25. I feel like I am really connecting with other people (R) 
26. People get frustrated by my unwillingness to bend 
27. Conversation bores me 
28. I am warm and friendly in my interactions with others (R) 
29. I leave long pauses in conversation 
30. I alter my daily routine by trying something different (R) 
31. I prefer to be alone rather than with others 
32. I lose track of my original point when talking to people 
33. I like to closely follow a routine while working 
34. I can tell when it is time to change topics in conversation (R) 
35. I keep doing things the way I know, even if another way might be better 
36. I enjoy chatting with people (R) 
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Appendix D: SPQ-CP Items 
1. I have had the sense that some person or force is around me, even though I cannot see 
anyone 
2. I am sure people can tell what I am thinking 
3. Some common events or items seem to be a special sign for me 
4. I pick up hidden threats or put-downs from what people say or do 
5. When shopping I feel that other people are taking notice of me 
6. I have had experiences with astrology, seeing the future, UFOs, ESP, or a sixth sense 
7. I feel suddenly distracted by distant sounds that I am not normally aware of 
8. I have to keep an eye out to stop people from taking advantage of me 
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Appendix E: Screenshot of HTML Questionnaire 
 
Figure E1. Cropped screenshot of the BAPQ and SPQ-CP as administered to participants. 
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Appendix F: Examples of Stimuli from Experiment 1 
 
Figure F1. Example of a still from a social video stimulus, question: “Does SHE think that HE is joking?” 
  
Figure F2. Example of a still from a social video stimulus, question: “Does SHE think that HE understands?” 
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Figure F3. Example of a still from a physics video stimulus, question: “Would the scale peak higher for a faster 
elevator?” 
 
Figure F4. Example of a still from a physics video stimulus, question: “Would the scale peak higher for a faster 
elevator?”  
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Figure F5. Example of a social text stimulus, question: “Does Eric's mother think that her son will be thankful?” 
 
Figure F6. Example of a physics text stimulus, question: “Does the pitch get higher as the train slows down?” 
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Appendix G: Examples of ADFES Stimuli 
 
Figure G1. Example of a video still from the ADFES (Pictured: surprise, images are stills from their respective 
video clips). 
 
Figure G2. Example of a video still from the ADFES (Pictured: pride, images are stills from their respective video 
clips). 
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Appendix H: Instruction Screens from Experiment 1 
 
Figure H1. Instruction screen one from Experiment 1. 
 
Figure H2. Instruction screen two from Experiment 1. 
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Figure H3. Instruction screen three from Experiment 1. 
 
Figure H4. Instruction screen four from Experiment 1. 
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Appendix I: Instruction Screens from Experiment 2 
 
Figure I1. Instruction screen one from Experiment 2. 
 
Figure I2. Instruction screen two from Experiment 2. 
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Figure I3. Instruction screen three from Experiment 2. 
 
Figure I4. Instruction screen four from Experiment 2. 
 
132                             INVESTIGATING SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND REASONING 
 
 
Figure I5. Instruction screen five from Experiment 2. 
 
Figure I6. Instruction screen six from Experiment 2. 
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Figure I7. Instruction screen seven from Experiment 2. 
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Appendix J: Instruction Screens from Experiment 3 
 
Figure J1. Instruction screen one from Experiment 3.  
 
Figure J2. Instruction screen two from Experiment 3. 
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Figure J3. Instruction screen three from Experiment 3. 
 
Figure J4. Instruction screen four from Experiment 3. 
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Figure J5. Instruction screen five from Experiment 3. 
 
Figure J6. Instruction screen six from Experiment 3. 
 
 
